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Abstract
Cooperative behavior, the costly provision of benefits to others, is common across
all domains of life. This review article discusses cooperative behavior in the microbial
world, mediated by the exchange of extracellular products called public goods. We focus
on model species for which the production of a public good and the related growth disad-
vantage for the producing cells are well described. To unveil the biological and ecological
factors promoting the emergence and stability of cooperative traits we take an interdis-
ciplinary perspective and review insights gained from both mathematical models and
well-controlled experimental model systems. Ecologically, we include crucial aspects of
the microbial life cycle into our analysis and particularly consider population structures
where an ensemble of local communities (sub populations) continuously emerge, grow,
and disappear again. Biologically, we explicitly consider the synthesis and regulation
of public good production. The discussion of the theoretical approaches includes gen-
eral evolutionary concepts, population dynamics, and evolutionary game theory. As a
specific but generic biological example we consider populations of Pseudomonas putida
and its regulation and utilization of pyoverdines, iron scavenging molecules. The review
closes with an overview on cooperation in spatially extended systems and also provides
a critical assessment of the insights gained from the experimental and theoretical studies
discussed. Current challenges and important new research opportunities are discussed,
including the biochemical regulation of public goods, more realistic ecological scenarios
resembling native environments, cell to cell signalling, and multi-species communities.
Keywords: public good, pseudomonas, structured populations, evolutionary
game theory, demographic noise
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1. Introduction
1.1. The conundrum of cooperative behavior in the theory of evolution
Cooperative behavior in human societies is defined as an interaction between
individuals directed towards a common goal that is mutually beneficial. Such
‘social’ behavior is not restricted to humans but actually widespread in nature.
Variants of it can be found in animal populations, down to insect societies and
evenmicrobial populations. How can one reconcile such ‘altruistic’ behaviorwith
the fact that organisms are generally perceived as being inherently competitive?
Addressing this conundrum in evolutionary biology, Darwin wrote in his book
“Origin of the Species” [66]:
"... one special difficulty, which at first appeared to me insuperable,
and actually fatal to my whole theory."1
What difficulty exactly is Darwin referring to? A key element in the Dar-
winian theory of evolution is natural selection, i.e. the differential survival and
reproduction of individuals in a population that exhibit different traits (including
different types of behavior). Cooperative behavior, while beneficial to all or some
other individuals present in a population, is costly to individuals exhibiting that
trait. This entails a fitness disadvantage which ultimately should lead to the ex-
tinction of all the individuals that exhibit cooperative behavior. How, despite this,
cooperation is maintained — or has evolved in the first place — is a conundrum
in evolutionary biology [68, 13].
The puzzling aspect of cooperative behavior can also be illustrated by com-
paring its benefits at different levels of a population: A population (or a society)
as a wholemight benefit from the cooperative behavior of a subset of individuals.
However, at an individual level, this behavior can be ‘exploited’ by other individ-
uals (often called ‘free-riders’) that benefit from the cooperative behavior but do
not participate in such cooperative behavior. As a consequence, cooperating in-
dividuals die out to everyone’s loss. This circumstance is known as the ‘dilemma
of cooperation’. As we will learn in the following, this dilemma is actually part
of a possible answer to Darwin’s difficulty, as it hints towards the importance of
population structure and spatial organization in a population for the evolution
and maintenance of cooperation and biological diversity in general.
1The citation actually refers to eusociality, which is special kind of cooperative behavior,
found, for example, in some insect populations.
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1.2. The dilemma of cooperation in the microbial world
A myriad of theoretical and experimental studies have investigated different
aspects of cooperative traits and a broad variety of mechanisms ensuring their
emergence and evolutionary stability, covering a variety of biological systems,
reviewed in Refs. [169, 171, 71, 262, 367, 98, 10, 302]. In this review, we
will focus on cooperative behavior in the microbial world: Bacteria and other
microbial cells mostly live in communities, often consisting of multiple pheno-
types or species [188, 87, 51, 54, 247]. Interactions between individuals in these
systems are typically mediated by the secretion of various kinds of extracellu-
lar products (exoproducts) including metabolites, exoenzymes like siderophores,
matrix components in biofilms, signalling molecules, and different types of tox-
ins [381, 315, 2, 16, 328]. A particular kind of exoproducts are those that benefit
others in a community, which in the following we will refer to as “public goods".
If, in addition, the synthesis of a public good is costly to the producing cells, it is
commonly referred to as cooperative behavior [380, 364, 98, 3, 64, 272, 40, 319].
In our discussions we will focus on systems where genetic differences are small
and linked to the public good production. We will not discuss other genetic
changes beyond these, like fundamental changes in metabolism or other funda-
mental physiological processes common in multi-species communities.
Our objective is to address the question of emergence and stability of coopera-
tive traits within microbial populations from an interdisciplinary perspective that
discusses both, abstract mathematical models which originated from evolution-
ary biology), and experimental model systems where specific microbial species
are studied under well-controlled laboratory conditions. This interdisciplinary
perspective will require from a reader with either background to show some will-
ingness to learn about the respective other field, and we hope to provide sufficient
details to guide readers from either fields.
The rapid advancement of research onmicrobial communities and cooperation
makes it necessary to further confine the range of topics that we address in this
review article. We restrict ourselves to the discussion of well-characterized
bacterial systems much simpler than the complex community structures native
microbial populations on this planet might show [256, 327, 54, 51]. Further,
in describing the theoretical work in the field, we will mainly discuss the work
that links to these systems and discuss their relation to more general approaches
investigating cooperation. Lastly, we will mostly confine ourselves to locally
well-mixed scenarios, for which spatial effects can be neglected. In particular,
we do not consider the rich spatial arrangement of microbes within colonies
and biofilms [251, 87]. Explicitly accounting for space leads to a plethora of
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intriguing and important phenomena and we give a short (but incomplete) review
of recent progress in the field towards the end of this review article. While
we attempt to provide a broader overview of the field, the specific examples
discussed in detail follow our personal research background, and we apologize
for not covering other important work on microbial cooperation.
Given the ecological variety of microbial life and the biochemical complexity
of cells and their interactions, many different aspects can be important in shaping
the evolution of microbial populations and the emergence and stability of their
(cooperative) traits. Throughout this review, we repeatedly discuss three such
aspects in great detail, which we think are particularly important to consider:
• Microbial populations are highly structured: Evolutionary dynamics is
occurring simultaneously in a set of different sub-populations and these
sub-populations continuously emerge and disappear over time.
• The life cycles of microbes include strong phases of growth, and sub-
populations can vary in size over several orders of magnitude — from a
few initial cells (if not a single one) to the billions or even trillions of an
established community.
• Public goods are not simply continuously produced by the cells. Instead, as
it happens for many other phenotypes, regulatory networks tightly control
the expression of public goods, based on other cellular processes and the
environmental conditions cells sense.
A proper consideration of public goods, or — more generally — exoprod-
ucts in bacteria thus requires the consideration of population structure, growth,
stochastic effects of demographic and environmental noise, as well as the biolog-
ical aspects of public good synthesis and utilization. The aspects of population
structure and growth dynamics across bacterial life-cycles can already be consid-
ered by theoretical considerations alone and we discuss those and their relations
to formulations of evolutionary theory. While equally important, the regulatory
aspects of public good production require a detailed consideration of the specific
biological system one aims to understand. In this review, we will illustrate this
requirement by considering specifically the bacteria Pseudomonas putida and its
regulation and utilization of pyoverdines, which are public goods produced to
support iron uptake.
1.3. Outline
In the following Section 2 we will first discuss the dilemma of cooperation
from a broader perspective that also includes cooperation of higher organisms.
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This is mainly meant to give the reader some background on the long and con-
voluted history of the topic (2.1). Next, we will discuss the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’
(2.2), a classical example that illustrates the dilemma of cooperation. This is fol-
lowed by a concise review of the possible conceptual resolutions of the dilemma:
assortment and reciprocity (2.3).
Section 3 discusses important characteristics of microbial life and evolution.
It provides an overview of the literature on experimental model systems studying
cooperative interactions in bacterial populations (3.2), and discusses assortment
as an essential factor for a resolution of the cooperation dilemma (3.1). This is
followed by a short introduction into microbial model systems in Section 4 which
are used to study evolution (4.1), cooperation via public good production (4.2),
and the role of structured populations (4.3) in laboratory populations.
In Section 5, we will then review the most important theoretical concepts
and mathematical methods available to consider evolutionary dynamics and the
dilemma of cooperation in well-mixed populations. Concepts discussed include
the Price and replicator equations (5.1 and 5.2), evolutionary game theory (5.3),
and the theory of stochastic processes (5.4). We will also discuss models of
population dynamics to specifically consider growth of microbial populations
(5.5). We will keep the level of mathematical detail to a minimum and focus
mainly on those aspects of the theories that are of key relevance for the following
discussions.
Section 6 introduces the general concepts available to consider evolution in
structured populations. The concepts of group- and kin-selection are critically
discussed (6.1 and 6.2), as are the two-level consideration based on the Price
equation and Hamilton’s rule (6.3 and 6.4). This is merely to explain these
often-used and historically loaded concepts in the context of this review.
Section 7 provides then a detailed overview of the biology of the public good
pyoverdine in Pseudomonas populations. It includes the biochemical charac-
terization of pyoverdine production and regulation to illustrate the considerable
complexity of the public good production in microbial systems. Moreover, we
discuss why Pseudomonas putida can serve as a well-defined experimental model
system for studying cooperation in bacterial populations.
This experimental characterization of a specific biological system is then the
basis for the mathematical models discussed in Section 8, where we elucidate
the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behavior in structured populations,
focusing on pyoverdine production as an example. The section reviews recent
advances in understanding the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in bac-
terial populations that have a life-cycle populations structure. The discussion
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shows how experiment and theory complement each other to dissect the role of
environmental noise, demographic noise and selection. In the first Section 8.1,
we will illustrate the role of assortment noise in growing bacterial populations in
which the selection pressure is weak. This is followed by a theoretical analysis
of the combined role of selection pressure, growth advantage of more cooper-
ative sub-populations, and demographic noise on the dynamics of an ensemble
of populations containing cooperators and defectors (8.2). The main insight will
be that the interplay between these factors can lead to the emergence of a tran-
sient increase in cooperator fraction in the whole population. Next, we review
experiments and detailed mathematical modeling of a P. putida model system
that confirms these predictions qualitatively and elude on the role of molecular
features of public goods (8.3). Combining the above, we discuss how life cycles
can lead to both the maintenance and the evolution of cooperation in bacterial
populations (8.4).
Finally, we will briefly review spatially extended systems in Section 9, and
conclude with a concise summary and a brief outlook in Section 10.
2. The dilemma of cooperation and possible resolutions
2.1. A broader perspective of the dilemma of cooperation
Before focusing on bacterial systemswewould like to broaden our perspective
for a moment and discuss cooperation in general terms elucidating the variety and
omnipresence of such social behaviour; this summary followsRef. [56]. In human
behaviour, cooperation and the ensuing dilemma can be found on almost every
interaction scale and in diverse fields ranging from psychology, to sociology, pol-
itics, and economics. This starts with interactions of individuals in small entities
like families and ordinary tasks like sharing responsibilities in a household and
goes to humanity as a whole, for instance in facing the global challenge of climate
change. Humans are endowed with a broad range of mechanisms promoting co-
operation [83]: Due to our ability to recognise and remember other individuals,
we can (to a certain extend) distinguish cooperators from cheaters and thereby
prevent interactions with cheaters, warn others, or even punish cheaters [31].
Nevertheless, different plots of the dilemma of cooperation are still omnipresent
in human life. Hence, the origin and nature of cooperativity in human societies
and its limitations is a heavily debated topic [342, 321]: Is cooperative behavior
an inherent characteristic of human beings? How important are early childhood
experiences and the first social interactions with other humans? How does culture
come into play? Which role does punishment and the ability to form institutions
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have? Which aspects are special for humans and in which respect does the
cooperative behavior of Homo sapiens differ from other Hominidae?
Beyond humans, cooperation is also widespread in the animal kingdom. Ex-
amples include the herd formation of gregarious animals [49]. While beneficial
for the whole population, animals on the outer edges take a higher risk of preda-
tion. Executing alarm calls, as observed for birds and monkeys, is another strong
form of cooperation [49, 321]. The surrounding individuals are warned, while
at the same time the caller is strongly increasing the attention of the discovered
predator.
Another often stated extreme form of cooperation is the separation of working
and reproducing individuals in insect populations, see e.g. Ref. [150, 117]. Why
for example are most of the individuals sterile female ‘workers’ or other special-
ized individuals supporting the reproduction of one or a few fertile ‘queens’? The
classical explanation for cooperation within such colonies or super-organisms is
the strong relatedness of kin [266]. From a ’gene’s eye view’, genetically identical
workers still reproduce their genes by supporting the queen. However, the precise
reasons for cooperation in insect colonies and protective measures against genet-
ically different individuals are more subtle, and different species might adopt
different mechanisms [169, 287, 214]. This includes kin discrimination and
reciprocity [91].
Finally, for unicellular organisms cooperation is widespread as well. As
mentioned already in the introduction, microbial populations cooperation is often
given by the production of a public good [353, 195, 368, 34, 109, 118, 128, 37].
Striking examples include the synthesis of matrix-proteins for biofilm formation,
or the production of extracellularly acting enzymes for better nutrient or mineral
uptake [87, 251, 118]. Another well-studied example of cooperation in microbes
is the formation of fruiting bodies, for example in the slime mold Dictyostelium
discoideum [326, 303]. While formation increases dispersal rates and therefore
the exploitation of new nutrient resources, cooperation involves altruism as stalk
cells cannot disperse but die.
Mechanisms described to maintain cooperation involve, for example, limited
diffusion of a public good, spatial restrictions and cell-cell contacts [199, 200,
163], metabolic constraints controlling social cheating [65], or the presence
of a loner strain in a producer and non-producer system [157]. We discuss a
few examples of microbial cooperation in more detail in Section (4.1), but first
consider the prisoner’s dilemma, the classical and most famous example of game
theory, to illustrate the dilemma of cooperative behavior.
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2.2. Game theory: the prisoner’s dilemma and public good games
To further illustrate the dilemma of cooperation, let us consider one spe-
cific situation, the prisoner’s dilemma [13], which has become a mathematical
metaphor to describe cooperative behavior [226, 262, 261, 98]. The original
formulation refers to a scenario where two criminals are interrogated. Each
criminal can testify against the other (non-cooperating behavior) or remain silent
(cooperating behavior) [13]. Here, we present it as public good game where in-
dividuals adopting two different strategies, called ‘cooperation’ and ‘defection’,
play against each other. The pairwise interactions between these two different
‘strategies’ are summarised in what is called a payoff matrix:
P cooperator defector
cooperator b − c −c
defector b 0
A ‘cooperator’ provides a benefit b at a cost c to itself (with b−c > 0). In contrast,
a ‘defector’ (or ‘free-rider’) ‘refuses’ to provide any benefit and hence does not
pay any costs. Thus, in an interacting between two cooperators, both obtain the
effective payoff b−c. If a cooperator interacts with a defector, the defector obtains
the benefit b, while the cooperator does not obtain any benefit but still has to pay
the costs c (negative payoff −c). In an interaction between two defectors there
are no costs but also no benefits. Hence, for the ‘selfish’ individual (‘defector’),
irrespective of whether the competitor cooperates or defects, defection is always
favourable, as it avoids the cost of cooperation, exploits cooperators, and ensures
not to become exploited. In other words, adopting the strategy ‘defection’ is
the only strategy that can not be exploited; in game theory it is called a Nash-
equilibrium [226]. The dilemma is that everybody is then, with a gain of 0, worse
off compared to a state of universal cooperation, where a net gain of b − c > 0
would be achieved.
Instead of viewing the public good game as a strategic game, it can also be
interpreted as a population dynamics problemwhere individuals interact in a pair-
wise fashion with a reproductive fitness determined by the payoff matrix [226];
for a mathematical formulation see Section 5.3. As defectors are always better
off in pairwise interactions with cooperators, their number will increase in the
population such that in the long run there will only be defectors. Mathematically,
this can be formulated as a differential equation for the fraction of cooperators, x;
for more details see later in Section 5.3. Assuming that every individual interacts
with all other individuals in a population with equal probability, and taking the
expected payoff-values as expected fitness-values, the temporal change in the
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fraction of cooperators, x, follows the equation
dx
dt
= − c x (1 − x) . (1)
For c > 0, and independent of the initial amount of cooperators the dynamics
always declines towards the state x = 0 (no cooperators), which is hence called an
attractive fixed point of the dynamics. In this sense, the above Nash equilibrium
is also called evolutionary stable. Not cooperating is an ‘evolutionary stable
strategy’ [228].
The prisoner’s dilemma in its evolutionary formulation is a paradigmatic ex-
ample in evolutionary game theory, a theoretical framework considered in more
detail in Section 5.3. It nicely shows how fitness can be motivated heuristi-
cally without reference to a specific biological systems and further illustrates
the dilemma of cooperation. However, it should not be mistaken as a realistic
model for an actual biological or ecological process like the cooperative dynamics
within a bacterial population. In real systems, interactions between individuals
are much more complex and there are many important biological or ecological
factors which need to be considered. For microbial systems, we have already
mentioned growth in structured populations and the regulatory control of public
goods as important aspects and we discuss these and others in more detail in the
following Section 3. An in-depth discussion of realistic cost and benefit functions
is provided in Section 7 for the example of pyoverdine producing bacteria.
2.3. Reciprocity and assortment can stabilize cooperation
In view of the complexity of biological systems and the manifold types of
cooperative behaviour it would be surprising to find a universal answer to the
questions how cooperative behavior originated and how is it maintained. In fact,
the solutions to the cooperation dilemma are as diverse as the observed forms of
cooperation [349, 321, 169, 147, 41, 169, 171, 262, 367, 98, 302, 10]. However,
at a conceptual level, one can roughly distinguish between two main classes of
mechanisms: reciprocity and assortment.2
Reciprocity. If individuals have sophisticated skills like the ability to recognise
other individuals and memorise their behaviour, they might actively adjust their
behavior to obstruct the exploitation of non-cooperators to themselves or others:
2Note that this classification is not unique and other authors might prefer to sort using different
categories. [169, 171, 392, 262, 367].
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cooperation is maintained by reciprocity [349, 262, 321]. In general, one dis-
tinguishes between direct and indirect reciprocity. Direct reciprocity builds on
repeated interactions. For example, in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game it
includes the famous ‘tit for tat’ strategy [13], where individuals continue cooper-
ating only if playing with another individual that was cooperating during the last
engagement. Indirect reciprocity also accounts for third parties and some sort of
communication. More complex forms of memory-based mechanisms promoting
cooperation include punishment [31, 300, 139, 270, 262] and policing [83, 388].
Assortment. Cooperation may also be facilitated by a high degree of relatedness
among interacting individuals such that cooperators interact more likely with
each other than with non-cooperating free-riders. In such a situation cooperators
can benefit from other cooperators, and they also run a lower risk to be exploited
by non-cooperating free-riders. Possible ecological scenarios promoting such an
assortment include spatially extended systems [263, 137, 298, 112, 19, 21, 20],
populations structured into distinct sub-populations [376, 317, 88, 195, 159, 177,
236, 335, 336, 222] or more complex interactions between different individuals
within a population (networks) [215, 305, 269, 274, 5].
3. Microbial communities
Microbes are the most widespread life form on our planet. These organisms,
which appear simple only at first glance, exhibit tremendous diversity and are able
to adapt to a multitude of changing environmental conditions [36, 307, 382, 165].
For example, they balance the cellular demands to optimize growth, uptake and
survival under a range of environmental conditions by changing the composi-
tion of expressed proteins [382, 27, 152]. But strategies to adapt do not only
involve a controlled change of protein resources. Cells also control the conser-
vation and change of their own DNA integrity. For instance, during prolonged
starvation Bacillus subtilis differentiates into phenotypic distinct cell types to
realize different survival strategies like the uptake of foreign DNA (compe-
tence) [85, 44, 210, 209]. Furthermore, microbes often live in complex com-
munities where they interact in various ways. Besides the already mentioned
production of public goods, this includes communication via signaling like quo-
rum sensing [18, 238, 253, 22, 166, 387, 340, 65, 359, 164], the exchange of
metabolites [118, 256, 80, 63, 221, 100, 75], but also competition for nutrients
and the accumulation of waste-products [97, 249, 250, 309, 101, 114, 43, 361].
These interactions are often occurring within dense biofilm communities [324,
307, 323, 74, 251].
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The realization of the existence of these manifold interactions has led to the
establishment of microbial community research as an important field of micro-
biology. Cooperation via public goods, exchange of metabolites, and signalling
molecules in these communities is often so pronounced that some researches even
see microbial communities as social entities performing sophisticated processes
like division of labor and communication, although anthropomorphic wording
should be chosenwith care [353, 186, 368, 364, 117, 73]. Asmanymicrobial com-
munities, such as many biofilms, are spatially heterogeneous entities built up of
many independent subunits, they have been even posited by some authors asmodel
systems for understanding the evolution of multi-cellularity [283, 252, 286].
3.1. Assortment in microbial populations
Given these variant microbial lifestyles, what are possible mechanisms and
principles promoting cooperative behavior? Since microbial organisms are lim-
ited in their ability to recognise specific other individuals and memorise their
behavior, they can hardly rely on reciprocity based mechanisms to ensure co-
operation. Correspondingly, assortment mechanism are crucial to overcome the
dilemma of cooperation. For microbial populations, assortment can be facilitated
by a number of biological and ecological factors. As for assortment mechanisms
for other organisms, the factors can roughly be divided into two classes: active
assortment and passive assortment.3
Active assortment. For active assortment, individuals themselves contribute ac-
tively to a positive assortment; cooperators ‘preferentially’ engage with other
cooperators. While this does not require the ability to memorise previous inter-
actions, it still requries the capability of cooperators to identify other cooperators.
While such a form of kin-discrimination might be present in higher developed
organisms, like in animal societies [150], examples in less sophisticated forms of
life have also been proposed. This includes in particular the idea of ‘green-beard’
genes [131, 110, 365, 282, 320] which directly encode for cooperative behavior
and also some recognition mechanism, allowing for cooperative individuals to
actively recognize the cooperative trait of others. However, the stable realization
of such green-beard mechanisms might be limited in reality as cheating mutants
which simply pretend to be cooperators can emerge [110, 365, 158, 347].
3As for the classification of the more general mechanisms promoting cooperation, other
authors might prefer other classification schemes.
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Passive assortment. Accordingly, passive assortment is likely the predominant
scenario to stabilize cooperation in microbial populations. Cooperating microbes
engage more often with other cooperators due to the external environmental con-
ditions. One scenario of such passive assortment has already been suggested by
Hamilton, who argued that limited dispersal and mixing can lead to the coex-
istence of related individuals (like cooperators) close to each other [133]. For
example, a high viscosity of the surrounding media can hinder motility and hence
cooperating individuals might more likely ‘interact’ with other neighboring co-
operating individuals. An extreme form of this scenario are spatially extended
populations where through spatial clustering (immobile) cooperators preferen-
tially interact with other cooperators [133, 263, 299, 77].
3.2. Growth and dynamically restructuring populations
Given the diversity of microbial communities and their habitats, the ecologi-
cal and biological factors shaping assortment dynamics in microbial populations
can be manifold, varying tremendously from species to species and from habitat
to habitat. However, as we mentioned already in the introduction, a few fac-
tors appear to be very generic characteristics of microbial life and important to
consider assortment dynamics and evolution.
Microbial growth. The first aspect important to consider is microbial growth:
Many microbial organisms can grow very fast, provided they encounter the right
conditions. Doubling times can be as low as 20 minutes [243, 255, 113], and this
fast growth is important for bacterial cells to compete with other species within
their microbial community [176, 235, 58]. The importance of growth for the
fitness of microbial cells is emphasized by the carefully coordinated regulation
of genes. Consider for example the allocation of protein-synthesis resources
into synthesis-related and other proteins: the condition-dependent regulation
of ribosomes ensures their optimal utilization, preventing their waste-full and
growth-limiting over-expression [311, 312, 152, 17, 392, 145, 343]. Fast growth
and nutrient availability is also the basis for the huge number of microbial cells
observed in many habitats. As the fast growth of microbes relies on the supply
of nutrients, the abundance of microbial cells is tied to the availability of nutrient
sources. Thus, as a consequence of distributed nutrient sources continuously
changing over space and time, microbial populations are typically highly struc-
tured. Many different sub-populations form a population [127, 368, 87, 182].
The exact structure depends on the ecological specifics a population encoun-
ters, but many examples can illustrate the structuring. For instance, popula-
tions of gut-bacteria are distributed across many hosts, and within the gut di-
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gestible food particles, are heterogeneously distributed [39, 57, 11]. Marine
bacteria specialized in degrading organic matter occupy zillion flakes of marine
snow [268, 181, 123], and the lab-strain E. coli MG1655 is distributed across
several laboratories worldwide. Evolutionary dynamics is steadily happening
simultaneously in all sub-populations.
Dynamic restructuring of populations. A further important aspect of structured
populations is the dynamics of their restructuring. Particularly, despite strong
growth dynamics and huge cell numbers that can be reached within each sub-
population, sizes of the locally confined populations can also be very small. This
is especially the case immediately after the occupation of newly available habitats
where prolonged phases of growth have not occurred yet and sub-populations can
go through narrow bottlenecks. In the extreme limit, growth in newly available
habitats start with only a single or a few bacterial cells, dispersing from other sub-
populations. To illustrate this dynamical restructuring process, consider again
the different examples mentioned before: The intestine of the mammalian gut
gets occupied starting from birth with a small number of bacteria, for example
Bifidobacterium cells, intestinal populations of different bacterial species then
start to emerge occupying their specific niches over the first few months [313,
204, 355]. Related to the nutrient intake of the host, new clusters of nutrient
sources, like clusters of resistant starch and fibers, reach the intestine every day,
and are captured by bacteria when they reach the distal parts of the intestine.
A similar restructuring of the microbial population dynamics is happening for
marine bacteria feeding on marine snow. These debris particles are continuously
supplied fromupper layers of the ocean and first need to be occupied by themarine
bacteria feeding on them [268, 123]. Finally, consider the process of ‘plating’
of bacterial cells in the laboratory as an artificial example. Here, bacterial
cultures are diluted to low densities such that the spreading of the culture onto
a growth supporting agar plate leads to growth of separated microbial colonies,
each starting with a single cell. For E. coli MG1655 repeated plating led to
the formation of various laboratory stocks and some substantial variation has
occurred across the meta-population [140].
Thus, overall, microbial populations are highly structured and the dynamical
restructuring process often involves bottlenecks and phases of strong growth.
However, the detailed characteristics of the population structure, growth and the
restructuring process illustrated here can vary strongly from example to example
and the involved time and length scales might change considerably.
Accordingly, passive forms of assortment in dynamically restructuring popu-
lations might provoke sub-populations where cooperators engage predominantly
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with other cooperators. However, non-cooperators are always better off than
neighbouring cooperating individuals and hence the positive assortment of coop-
erators persistently has to overcome this direct advantage of the non-cooperators.
Given this competition and the variation of assortment processes illustrated above,
simplymentioning assortment and the clustering of cooperating individuals alone
is not answering how cooperative behavior is maintained. Instead, one has to
study the details of assortment dynamics and how they lead to the evolutionary
stability of cooperation and public good production.
Adding to complexity, microbes themselves can also actively influence their
life cycle by sensing environmental conditions and reacting to it - a factor which
should be explicitely considered formany specieswhen studying cooperation. For
example, studies ofP. aeruginosa [324, 307, 127] suggest that typical life cycles of
biofilm-forming pseudomonads pass through different steps, with dispersal events
which are triggered by the local collections of cells and the nutrient conditions
they encounter.
In the remaining part of this review we focus on the case of structured
populations with well-mixed sub-populations when studying the emergence and
stability of cooperation. We focus on well-characterized bacterial systems and
precisely defined synthetic environments.
4. Studying evolution and cooperative behavior under controlled laboratory
conditions
4.1. Evolutionary studies with microbes in the laboratory
Microbial populations offer unique opportunities to experimentally study evo-
lution: Microbial cells grow fast, leading to large population sizes and evolution
on fast time-scales. Moreover, samples can easily be stored and analyzed at later
time points [161, 50, 79, 167]. By now microbial systems have been used to
study different aspects of evolutionary dynamic in the laboratory [115, 79]. Ex-
amples include long-term evolution experiments [79, 196, 211, 116] observing
adjustment in fitness over thousands of generations, the evolution of speciation
in continues culture [301, 185], and the adjustment of swimming and chemotaxis
in spatially extended habitats [23, 92, 258, 217].
4.2. Microbial systems to study public goods
Since some time now, laboratory experiments have also been used to study
cooperative behavior of bacteria and the selection dynamics in different highly
controlled environments. Much research concerning the cooperative behaviour of
bacteria is performed for well-characterized microbes in simplified experimental
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model systems offering the possibility to gain understanding under well-defined
conditions. In the following we briefly discuss some of the employed microbial
systems, but many more have been studied; see e.g. Refs. [38, 380, 364, 3, 64,
213, 272, 40, 229].
An often used model system for a cooperating microbe is the proteobacterium
Pseudomonas aeruginosa [37, 136, 198, 202, 24]. Iron, which is usually bound
in large clusters, is essential for the metabolism of these bacteria. Therefore,
some individuals, the so-called producers, provide siderophores, which are iron
scavenging organic compounds. Producers release them as a public good into the
environment. Because of their large binding affinity to iron, these compounds can
solve single iron molecules and build siderophore-iron complexes [198, 202].
The freely diffusing complexes can be equally taken up by cooperators and
non-contributing free-riders. The dilemma arises due to the metabolic costs
associated with the production of the public good: Producers replicate slower
than free-riders and thereby have a fitness disadvantage. We discuss a related
iron scavenging system active in P. putida in detail in Section 7.
Another prominent and well-studied example is given by invertases hydrolyz-
ing disaccharides into monosaccharides in the budding yeast Saccaromyces cere-
visiae [76, 118, 222]. Budding yeast prefers to use the monosaccharides glucose
and fructose as carbon sources. If they have to grow on sucrose instead, the
disaccharide must first be hydrolyzed by the enzyme invertase. Since most of the
produced monosaccharides (99%) diffuses away and is shared with neighboring
cells, it constitutes a public good available to the whole microbial commu-
nity. This makes the population susceptible to invasion by mutants that save
the metabolic cost of producing invertase. Naively, this suggests that yeast is
playing the prisoner’s dilemma game and strains not producing the public good
are able to invade the population leading to the extinction of the producing wild
type strain. But, this is not the case. Gore and collaborators [118] have shown
that the dynamics is rather described by a snowdrift game, in which cheating can
be profitable, but is not necessarily the best strategy if others are cheating too.
The underlying reason is that the growth rate as a function of glucose is highly
concave and, as a consequence, the fitness function is non-linear in the payoffs.
The lesson to be learned from this investigation is that defining a payoff function
is not a trivial matter, and a naive replicator dynamics fails to describe biological
reality. As we will see in Section 7.2, the same is true for Pseudomonas popula-
tions. Hence, we believe that – quite generally – it is necessary to have a detailed
look on the nature of the biochemical processes responsible for the growth rates
of the competing microbes.
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Other well-studied examples exist as well. This includes the production of
polymers as public goods to hold communities together and provide to their
well-being, see e.g. Refs. [284, 386, 74, 73]. For example, the expression of
sticky polymers by P. fluorescens allows for the formation of stable microbial
colonies which enable the floating on liquids. Populations might benefit by the
effective access to oxygen at the air-liquid interface [284]. Further examples
discussed include the metabolic utilization of different carbon sources which
require the activity of digestive enzymes released by cells into the environment
[76, 189, 284, 285].
4.3. Studying population structure in artificial enviornments
To consider the influence of population structure on evolution and the sta-
bility of cooperative behavior, several experiments have been performed under
very controlled conditions in the lab using artificial environments.4 Structures
studied range from nanoscopic landscapes on a chip [175, 174, 205] to simple
rearranging group structures [37, 46, 47, 24, 187]. The latter approach is es-
pecially useful for studying the influence of reoccurring population bottlenecks.
For instance, these bottlenecks can account for species showing a life cycle. Such
synthetic biology experiments, which help to clarify the mechanisms promoting
cooperation in simple setups, may eventually lead to a broader understanding of
the cooperative behaviour in complex biological environments. In this review, we
consider and analyze specifically the stability of pyoverdine production with bac-
teria growing in different well-mixed sub-populations. But before, we introduce
the mathematical concepts required for the analysis of this case and cooperation
within structured microbial populations in general.
5. Mathematical formulation of evolutionarydynamics andpopulation growth
In this section we introduce basic mathematical approaches to describe the
evolutionary dynamics within populations. In particular, we will discuss evolu-
tionary dynamics in well-mixed populations, considering frequency-dependent
selection, demographic noise and population growth. Approaches to specifically
analyze the evolution and maintenance of cooperation in structured populations
build on these approaches and are discussed in the following Section 6. We
tried to keep the mathematical formulation simple and focus on the underlying
concepts instead. Readers with a focused interest on the biological aspects of
4Note that studies explicitly considering the spatial extension of bacterial populations are not
considered here but in Section 9.
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cooperation can skip these sections and continue by reading about the specifics
of pyoverdine production in Section 7.
5.1. Price equation
In 1970, George Price proposed a generic equation to describe evolutionary
dynamics including mutation and selection [279, 270, 134, 93, 47, 392, 173].
This equation is often used in the context of cooperation and we thus briefly
introduce its motivation, following its simplest form. Let us consider a population
containing N individuals with the individuals labeled by an index i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}.
Each individual is characterized by a trait, for example the body height or the
weight, and a certain value of this trait zi is assigned to each individual. At a given
time point t, each individual has the abundance hi = 1/N in the population.5 The
average value of the trait is therefore given by6 〈zi〉 := ∑i hizi = 1/N ∑i zi. Let
us now consider how the average value of the trait changes over time. For a given
time interval ∆t we describe the change by:
〈∆zi〉 = 〈z′i〉 − 〈zi〉. (2)
Here, 〈z′i〉 is the average trait value at time t′ = t + ∆t. Again this average value
can be calculated by 〈z′i〉 =
∑
i h′i z
′
i , but both the values of the trait, z
′
i , as well as
the abundances, h′i , might have changed during the time interval. Let us further
write the new trait of a certain individual i as z′i = zi + ∆zi. The new abundance
follows is a consequence of different processes affecting replication and survival
of individuals and their traits. To consider these differences, one can introduce
fitness factors wi7.8 The new abundance of an individual i can then be written
by dividing its fitness factor, wi, which corresponds to the number of individuals
of type i at time t + ∆t, by the new population size, N′. The new population
size can be calculated by multiplying N with the average growth factor in the
population, 〈wi〉 = ∑i wi/N . Taken together, the abundance at time t + ∆t is
5The index i can also be chosen to label the traits instead of the individuals. In this equivalent
notation the abundance hi corresponds to the probability to find the trait zi in the population.
6We choose the notation 〈zi〉 instead of 〈z〉i . This notation has some advantages when
discussing evolution in structure populations, see Appendix B.
7Importantly, these fitness factors are not the result of any specific theory considering repro-
duction or survival, they are simply introduced to consider differences in those processes and do
not make any statement about how the differences emerge.
8For example, consider reproduction within a certain time-interval: wi might be quantified by
2 for a trait (or genotype) which allows reproduction once during the time interval, and by 0 for
a trait which dies during the time interval.
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given by h′i =
wi
N ′ =
wi
〈wi〉N =
wi
〈wi〉 hi. To derive the Price equation, we look at the
average change of the trait value, Eq. (2), which simplifies to:
〈∆zi〉〈wi〉 = 〈ziwi〉 − 〈zi〉〈wi〉 + 〈∆ziwi〉
= Cov[ziwi] + 〈∆ziwi〉. (3)
This is the Price equation. It is stating that traits which are positively correlated
to the fitness factors increase in abundance, while others decline. As such, the
Price equation makes a statement about the change of the population, provided
fitness values are set; an illustration for evolution along a fitness landscape with
continuous trait values is shown in Fig. 1. However, it is important to realize
that the Price equation does not provide any answers to what sets fitness. In
this sense, the Price equation shares the same limitations as the famous phrase
‘survival of the fittest’: During evolution the fittest individuals prevail, but the
crucial question of how fitness values are set in a certain ecological setting is not
considered.9
To be able to predictively describe evolution, one has to go beyond the Price
equation and has to investigate evolutionary dynamics and establish fitness func-
tions for the specific situation one studies. This requires the detailed consideration
of the biological and ecological factors at play. Specific models are required to
consider the different factors and their interplay. For cooperationwithinmicrobial
populations this requires for example the aspects of population growth, popula-
tion structure, and the regulation of public goods. In general, many molecular
and ecological features might be of relevance, making a full understanding of the
dynamics of bacterial populations a multi-faceted and difficult endeavour.
Nevertheless, Price’s equation with its consideration of evolutionary changes
for given fitness values is an important starting point to think about evolution.
We further discuss this aspect with the related approach of replicator dynamics
in the next Section 5.2. Moreover, the generic form of the Price equation also
allows the consideration of evolution in structured populations and can thus also
be used to think about the dilemma of cooperation under such conditions, see
Section 6.3.
5.2. Replicator dynamics
To describe the evolutionary dynamics over time, the replicator dynamics
is also used often [226, 148, 338]. This approach considers the evolution of
9Interestingly, Herbert Spencer was coining this phrase having a more specific meaning in
mind, stressing that survival is also an important part of fitness.
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Figure 1: Evolutionary dynamics on a fitness-landscape. Different individuals in the population
have a certain trait, characterized by the value z. By definition, the population evolves according
to a trait dependent fitness factor w(z). For illustration of the dynamics, consider a specific fitness
function w(z) with two fitness peaks as shown in (a). Starting with a certain distribution of trait
values within the population, black line in (b), the population evolves successively towards higher
fitness values, colored lines in (b). More and more individuals adopt the fitter values over time,
which for this specific example are given by a smaller and a larger z value. The Price equation,
Eq. (3), describes only the average value of the trait within the population, 〈z〉. This is shown by
the dashed lines. This equation does not make any predictions about the distribution of trait values
in the population, nor does it make any statements about the cause of underlying fitness-values.
See text for further discussion.
different species with different fitness values over time. It can be mathematically
mapped to the Price equation as we further elaborate on in Appendix A. Thus, the
replicator dynamics does not provide any newconcepts, but the involved replicator
equations are often easier to read than Price equations. This is particularly true
for the frequency-dependent situations discussed in the following Section 5.3.
The replicator dynamics considers a population with d different species (with
distinct traits) where the relative abundance (frequency) of a species k is given
by xk . Species differ in their fitness which are assumed to have fixed values fk .
The reasoning to set up a dynamic equation is then as follows: One expects that
a given trait k will increase in frequency if its fitness fk is larger than the average
fitness in the population, 〈 f 〉 = ∑k xk fk . Conversely, xk will decrease if its
fitness lies below 〈 f 〉. Thus, the evolutionary dynamics is often described by
considering the following differential equation:
dxk
dt
= fk − 〈 f 〉 . (4)
This equation is known as the replicator equation, and adjusted replicator equa-
tion, respectively. dxkdt denotes the change of xk over time. xk increases if the22
fitness of k is larger than the average fitness, otherwise it decreases. Often, a
slightly adjusted form of the replicator equation is also used:
dxk
dt
=
fk − 〈 f 〉
〈 f 〉 . (5)
This adjusted replicator equation includes the same logic of selection and merely
differs in the choice of the time-scale. As the Price equation, the replicator
equations are heuristic and as such they do not provide arguments for choosing
fitness values. Hence, they should be read as conceptual mathematical equations
that capture selection given certain fitness values.
5.3. Frequency dependent fitness and evolutionary game theory
The Price and replicator equations describe evolutionary dynamics for given
fitness functions. As mentioned before, the exact fitness functions are typically
specific to the biological scenario one is studying. However, some aspects of
fitness functions can also be studied in more general frameworks. One particular
aspect is the idea of frequency-dependent selection accounting for the possi-
bility that the fitness of a certain trait may depend on the composition of the
population [212].
A quite successful approach to study such a scenario is evolutionary game
theory (EGT). It was introduced in 1973 by Price andMaynard-Smith [226, 227],
building on ideas and concepts developed in (classical) game theory by von
Neumann [257]. In game theory, the success of certain strategies depends on the
other participant participating in a game. Applied to evolution this means that
the fitness of a given species depends on the composition of the whole population
[226, 148, 338, 261].
Consider a population consisting of individuals with d different traits. Its
composition is described by the vector x = (x1, x2, ..., xd) where xk is the fraction
of trait k. As discussed in Section 2.2, one may represent the effect of the
interactions between traits as payoffs. These payoffs are summarised in the
payoff matrix, P, where the entries Pkl characterise the gain of an individual with
trait k when interacting with an individual with trait l. Fitness of a trait, fk ,
is then defined as a background (base) fitness (set to 1) plus the average payoff
obtained from interactions with all other individuals in the population
fα = 1 + s
∑
l
Pkl xl . (6)
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Here, s is the selection strengthweighting the relative importance of the frequency-
dependent fitness as compared to the base fitness of individuals. 10
Public good game. Let us illustrate this for the two-trait public good game intro-
duced in Section 2.2. From the payoff matrix, we read off
fC = 1 + s (b x − c) , (7)
fD = 1 + s b x . (8)
Thus, the following replicator equation describes the dynamics,
dxk
dt
x = −s c x (1 − x) , (9)
where x is the fraction of cooperators. This equation becomes identical to the
one stated in Section 2.1 upon setting s = 1 (which simply amounts to choosing a
time scale). Thus, the same conclusion holds: Independent of initial conditions,
dxk
dt is always negative and cooperative individuals always die out.
These considerations can be generalised to all two-player games [337, 265,
264, 71, 138, 8, 7, 306, 61, 62, 98, 231, 331] as well as to games with more than
two players, like three cyclically competing species; see e.g. Refs. [148, 224, 96,
172, 345, 291, 48, 61, 25, 6, 70, 276, 105, 183, 184] and references cited therein.
5.4. The role of fluctuations
The approaches to describe evolutionary dynamics introduced above are de-
terministic and neglect the effect of randomness and noise. In reality, however,
there are many sources of noise [233]. For instance, the environment may not
be constant but resources and other factors affecting the growth and death rates
of individuals may fluctuate in time. This is sometimes referred to as extrinsic
noise. Another source or noise which is rather intrinsic is due to the fact that
processes like reproduction, death, and mutation are random. This form of noise
is also referred to as demographic noise. In the following, we briefly consider the
most important concepts which are needed in the following chapters; for a more
detailed discussion of the different noise forms and the concepts to investigate
their effect on evolutionary dynamics please refer to Ref. [233]. To account for
random fluctuations in the size and the composition of a population, determinis-
tic models in form of ordinary differential equation like the replicator dynamics
10In principle the selection strength s can be submerged into the payoff parameters, Pkl ,but
it is often introduced to be able to switch between neutral dynamics and selection, see the
consideration of stochastic effects below.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the Moran process as an urn model. It describes the stochastic time
evolution of well-mixed finite populations with constant population size. Here, as an example, we
show a population consisting of two different traits (red and blue spheres). At each time step, two
randomly selected individuals are chosen (left picture) and interact with each other. Proportional
to their fitness and abundance individuals are replacing each other as described in the main text
(right picture).
are not sufficient. Instead, one needs to consider individual-based, stochastic
models. These models are best formulated in terms of master equations; the
interested reader may want to consult one of the standard textbooks on stochastic
processes [108, 99]. For simplicity, consider a population with only two different
traits, A and B, whose fitness is fA and fB, respectively. For a well-mixed popu-
lation, the population may be envisioned as an urn containing N individuals, NA
belonging to A and NB belonging to B, see Figure 2. The composition of the pop-
ulation is assumed to change stochastically according to some update rule, which
mathematically is given in terms of a transition rates and which also considers
the fitness differences within the population. A classical version is the Moran
process [244] defined as follows: Two individuals are picked at random with
probabilities given by their respective relative abundances. In the competition
between these individuals, the fitness determines the likelihood of winning. The
ensuing rates of replacement are given as
ΓB→A =
fA
〈 f 〉 xA xB and ΓA→B =
fB
〈 f 〉 xA xB . (10)
For a more general overview on stochastic models in this field see e.g. Ref. [28].
The full stochastic dynamics can be described in terms of a master equation
for the probability distribution function P(NA, t):
dP(NA, t)
dt
=
∑
S
[(E−A − 1) ΓS→A + (E+A − 1) ΓA→S] P(NA, t), (11)
where E±A are step operators increasing/decreasing the number of individuals of25
trait S by one [351], i.e. E±AP(NA) = P(NA ± 1).11 Solving such a master equation
in closed form is almost never possible. Therefore, one either has to resort on
numerical simulations or on approximation schemes. The lowest order of such
approximation, neglecting all correlations and fluctuations, corresponds to the
set of equations studied in the previous section, which is often also referred to as a
mean-field limit. For a Moran process this mean-field approximation just leads to
the adjusted replicator equation, Eq. (4), not considering any fluctuations. To ac-
count for fluctuations, various approximations can be be employed12. A common
one includes the derivation of the corresponding Fokker-Planck equation:
∂tP(x, t) = −∂xα(x)P(x, t) + 12∂
2
x β(x)P(x, t). (12)
where
α(x) = fAx − fB(1 − x)〈 f 〉 , and β(x) =
1
N
fAx + fB(1 + x)
〈 f 〉 . (13)
Here, ∂t and ∂x describe derivatives in time and abundance, and the equation is
now a partial differential equation. The first term describes directed drift. In
the large population size limit N → ∞, this is the only remaining term and the
dynamics is then given by the replicator equation, Eq. (4): dxdt = α(x). The
second term describes the impact of demographic fluctuations. Confusingly, it is
often referred to as random drift in the literature. This term describes deviations
from the deterministic solutions. The magnitude of this term scales as 1/N . As
an important consequence, fluctuations scale as 1/√N . Hence, the smaller a
population is, the more pronounced is the role of fluctuations. In particular, if
individuals occupy newhabitats or undergo external catastrophes decimating their
number, fluctuations gain importance and may alter the evolutionary outcome
drastically. Another example for the importance of fluctuations are propagating
fronts. At these front only a few individuals enter a new environment and
fluctuations gain special importance [35, 130, 144].
11For readers unfamiliar with this notation: the only important concept to get is that this
equation describes the change in probability for individuals of type A and B to increase or
decrease in abundance.
12Most common approximations include the Kramers-Moyal expansion [297] or the Omega
expansion proposed by van Kampen [351] . While the first one works well for a constant
population size, the second one is suitable for problems where this assumption is skipped. This
is particularly the case for microbial populations for which sizes can strongly change, this is for
example considered in Section 8.1.
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5.5. Population growth
The formulations introduced up to now do not explicitly include varying
population sizes. Strong growth is however an important characteristics of many
microbial populations. In this paragraph we thus briefly introduce some models
of population growth which we refer to later during this review.
One aspect particularly important for microbes is their fast and steady growth
characteristics: Under nutrient rich growth conditions, cells can grow steadily
over several generations [255]. In this case, increase in population size N can be
described well by exponential growth,
dN
dt
= µN , (14)
with the growth rate µ. This exponential growth eventually has to stop as the
increasing nutrient consumption of the growing population will necessarily lead
to a shortage in growth supplying nutrients. For microbes in well-defined cul-
turing conditions within the laboratory, this behavior can be described well by
Monod-kinetics and the explicit modeling of essential nutrient sources and their
consumption by cells [243]. The major characteristics of this dynamics, fast
growth when nutrient sources are highly abundant, and arrest of growth when
nutrients run out, is already described well by the simpler logistic growth [354]
dN
dt
= µN (1 − N/K) . (15)
Here, the population size cannot exceed the carrying capacity K . In the following
considerations, we use this simpler formulation to consider the evolutionary
consequences of bacterial growth on the stability of cooperative traits.
6. Evolution in structured populations - the frameworks of kin- and group-
selection
The mathematical models described in the previous Section 5 describe evo-
lutionary dynamics and population growth in well-mixed populations without
any population structure.13 However, as we discussed in Section 1.2, microbial
populations are highly structured and consist of many sub-populations. This
structure might promote the clustering of cooperators with other cooperators and
thus resolve the dilemma of cooperation; see Section 3.1. Historically, different
13To phrase it in game theory language: everyone can ’interact’ with everyone else.
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consequences of population structure on evolution of cooperation have been de-
scribed within the frameworks of kin-selection and group-selection.14 While we
think that both frameworks do not provide particularly valuable insights into the
requirements for stable cooperation, they are both commonly referred to, also in
the literature on microbial populations. In this section, we thus introduce these
frameworks, following our previous discussions [230, 56]. We further recom-
mend the review by Damore and Gore [64] on this topic. Though conceptually
important, this section is not strictly required for the following discussions on
cooperation in structured microbial cooperation; readers more interested in the
specifics of microbial cooperation can continue reading from Section 7.
Both the frameworks of kin-selection and group-selection, as well as their
more evolved descendants (inclusive fitness and the framework of multi-level
selection), have in common the attempt to provide general explanations for the
stability of cooperative behavior. The different frameworks and the controversial
debate about their relations have a long history. To better understand the con-
troversy we first start with the historical context of both theories, before briefly
introducing the mathematical approaches and their relations. We finish this sec-
tion by commenting on the implications of the results, and why we think that
these general conceptual frameworks provide no mechanistic insight about the
stability of cooperative behavior.
6.1. Group-selection
The idea that selection might not only take place between individuals but
also between larger entities or groups has been present in evolutionary theory
right since its original formulation. For example, Darwin already proposed to
consider such scenarios in his book ‘The Descent of Man’ [67]. The idea is that
the dilemma of cooperation can be overcome when groups with more cooperators
have a selection advantage compared to groups with less cooperators. Due to this
advantage on certain groups, the likelihood that a cooperator lives in a group with
a relatively high fraction of cooperators is increased and therefore exploitation
due to free-riders is reduced. Depending on the strength of this advantage and
costs of cooperation, cooperative behavior might prevail.
A first mathematical model investigating group-selection was introduced by
Sewall Wright [383, 384]. Since then, the concept of group-selection has been
a controversial issue, mainly because of a careless assumption often made at
14We intentionally avoid to use the term ‘theory’ here. While both frameworks are often called
theories, this is in our opinion misleading giving the limited predictive power of both frameworks;
see discussion below.
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the beginning: In many formulations, only evolutionary competition between
groups was considered, favoring cooperation. The evolutionary dynamics within
groups in which cooperators have a disadvantage compared to free-riders was
mostly neglected, thereby creating biased results. Despite that, the idea of group-
selection was widely used uncritically and especially put forward by Wynne-
Edwards [385] in themid 20th century. In that period, the dilemma of cooperation
was believed to be solved by selection on a group or even species level and the
latter was even referred to as species selection. However, this alleged success did
not hold for long. Drastic criticism was formulated for example by George C.
Williams [372] and the idea of group-selection became less and less popular.This
view was shared by Maynard-Smith, who tried to corroborate this discussion
using a mathematical model that considers two levels of selection (inter-group
and intra-group) into account, the haystack model [225]. He and others doubted
that group-selection could be a general tool to explain cooperative behavior due
to the restrictive conditions, such as strictly separated groups or a well-defined
regrouping step, which were assumed [358]. Since then, the dominant line
of thinking has been: group-selection is possible in principle but practically
not relevant. If the term group-selection is used in the strict sense of Wynne-
Edwards, then this statement is certainly true and already indicates for the first
time the semantic confusions which drive the debate. However, if one considers
group selection as a term stressing the existence of sub-populations like groups
and selection acting also on these entities, a benefit for cooperating individuals
cannot be controversial, see e.g. Refs. [373, 376, 358, 374, 317, 88, 158, 177,
346, 90, 153, 348].
Nowadays, many extensions of the idea of group-selection, including aweaker
definition of the term ‘group’, have been proposed to explain cooperative behavior,
often including selection on many levels and the framework of multi-level selec-
tion, see e.g. Refs. [375, 373, 377, 374, 321, 317, 170, 88, 177, 346, 270]. Still,
they encounter much criticism, especially from the proponents of kin-selection.
In Section 6.3 we will briefly discuss a particular situation of this framework in
which individuals are arranged in groups and then comment briefly on the debate.
But first, we consider the historical context of kin-selection.
6.2. Kin-selection
In contrast to group-selection, the framework of kin-selection emphasizes
relatedness and promotes Hamilton’s rule to explain cooperative behavior. The
idea is that interactions mostly among related individuals (same kin), leads to
a clustering of cooperating individuals and decreases the probability of being
exploited by non-related, non-cooperating individuals. Historically, kin-selection
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was motivated by the notion that one cannot only spread one’s own genes by
reproduction but also by supporting relatives sharing one’s genetic material.
This line of thinking was already acknowledged by Fisher and Haldane [86, 126].
Haldane in particular is often cited for providing the idea of kin-selection in
its simplest form, suggesting that kinship alone is sufficient to explain cooperative
behavior. Further, the idea of kin-selection is often summarized with a trivialized
version of ’Hamilton’s rule’, stating that cooperation is beneficial if the benefit b
of a cooperative behavior weighted by the genetic relatedness r (overlap of genes
between interacting individuals) exceeds the cost c for providing the cooperative
behavior:
b · r > c (16)
However, the involved quantities are not simply constants but complex non-linear
functions depending on several continuously changing variables. Oversimplified
interpretations of the inequality, as often discussed in textbooks, lead to enormous
misinterpretations concerning the reasons of cooperation.
Earlier population geneticists thinking about kin-selection were already aware
of these subtle issues. For example, they rarely talked about relation in the strict
kinship sense (like related individuals belong to the same family) and were fully
aware that more specific considerations are needed to make statements about
the stability of cooperative behavior. For example, Haldane himself humorously
wrote in his article “Population Genetics” published in 1955 [125]:
“Let us suppose that you carry a rare gene that affects your behavior
so that you jump into a flooded river and save a child, but you have
one chance in ten of being drowned, while I do not possess the gene,
and stand on the bank and watch the child drown. If the child’s
your own child or your brother or sister, there is an even chance
that this child will also have this gene, so five genes will be saved
in children for one lost in an adult. If you save a grandchild or a
nephew, the advantage is only two and a half to one. If you only
save a first cousin, the effect is very slight. If you try to save your
first cousin once removed the population is more likely to lose this
valuable gene than to gain it. (...) It is clear that genes making
for conduct of this kind would only have a chance of spreading in
rather small populations when most of the children were fairly near
relatives of the man who risked his life.”
Further, Hamilton’s own motivation for the inequality now bearing his name
clearly illustrates that the quantities involved in this relation are not simply con-
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stant parameters but very complex quantities; see also discussion below, Sec-
tion 6.4. As stressed by Haldane, Hamilton, and others, additional ecological or
biological conditions are needed to ensure that related individuals mostly inter-
act with each other, and that such a preferential interaction is maintained over
time. Most prominently, Hamilton summarized some of the necessary condi-
tions [133, 133]. He specifically mentioned the ability of individuals to recognize
their own kin, or the environmental condition leading to ’viscous populations’
and by such to an increased likelihood of related individuals interacting with
each other. While the ability to recognize related cooperating individuals might
be hard to maintain (but see discussion Section 3.1), many ecological conditions
might lead to the clustering of more related microbes. As such, the framework of
kin-selection shares similar ideas to that of group-selection. Indeed, the inclusive
fitness framework, a more general mathematical consideration of kin-selection
dating back to Hamilton, resembles the mathematical formulation of multi-level
selection, a general mathematical description of group-selection. In the fol-
lowing we discuss this relation, by considering evolution in a simply structured
population with individuals belonging to different groups first.
6.3. Two levels of selection and derivation of Hamilton’s rule
Historically, selection within structured populations has been analyzed by the
Price equation. Here we illustrate the idea behind this approach by looking at a
simple population structure with two types of individuals, A and B assigned to
different sub-populations (groups); see Fig. 3(a) for an illustration. This scenario
was first considered by Price and Hamilton [279, 134]; see also [93, 94, 270, 47]
for detailed reviews.
Within each group there is selection towards those individuals with a higher
reproduction rate. At the same time, groups may do better or worse, depending
on their internal composition (and possibly the competition with other groups).
Phrasing it differently, there is selection on two levels: within the group (intra-
group level) and between groups (inter-group level). If selection on both levels
favours one type of individual over the other, then the evolutionary outcome is
obvious and the interplay between both levels only sets the time scale of selection.
The situation is more interesting if the different levels favour different traits.
Consider the dilemma of cooperation as a specific example were individuals are
either public good providing cooperators (type A) or free-riders (type B). In this
situation, selection within groups favours the free-riders which save the costs for
providing the public good. At the same time, selection between groups can lead
to an advantage of more cooperative groups, see 3(b) for an illustration. Whether
type A or type B increases its global fraction in the population depends on the
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structuring of the population and the interplay of the two different levels. This
situation can be mathematically analysed with the Price equation and an example
is illustrated in Figure 3(c-e) for a specific assumption of fitness advantages within
groups and the competition between groups. The illustrated scenario shows a
scenario of Simpson’s paradox [46, 47]. While free-riders increase within each
group. The average level of cooperation within the population increases.
The Price equation approach to compare evolution on two levels is outlined
in Appendix B. Result of this analysis is a general form of Hamilton’s rule, an
inequality comparing the benefits arising from cooperation with its total costs
and relation, [279, 132]:
RB > C (17)
As with the simplified form stated in Eq. (16): for cooperation levels to increase
the benefit (B) weighted by the relatedness (R) has to exceed the costs (C).
6.4. A note on Hamilton’s rule
Importantly, Hamilton’s rule even in its general form, Eq. 17, is prone to over-
simplified, highly misleading interpretations. First, note that all three quantities
in Eq. (17) are complex functions which depend on the current state of the system
(definitions of the functions are provided in Appendix B). In particular, these
functions are not directly measurable quantities with constant values for costs,
benefits, and relatedness. Instead, they change over time and depend on the state
of the population. In particular, the variance terms defining relatedness R rely on
the details of the underlying population structure. Simpler versions of Hamilton’s
rule are only obtained for very specific cases. For example, as pointed out by
Chuang et al. [47],B, R, and C can only be assumed to be constant numbers if the
fitness terms fi,m and Gm depend linearly on the frequencies {xm}—a condition
hardly fullfilled in microbial populations [47, 24] (see Appendix B for notation).
Overall, the existence of Hamilton’s rule further supports the idea that the
fitness disadvantage of cooperative behaviour can in principle be overcome by
advantages on higher levels of selection (e.g. the group level). However, it
should not be misunderstood as a rule providing any mechanistic insights on how
population structures ensures the stability of cooperation: While the condition
can always be stated for a specific situation at a certain time, its predictive power
for evolutionary outcomes is rather limited. This is not surprising, as the Price
equation itself says nothing about the detailed dynamics but describes the change
of expectation values during a fixed time interval, provided the fitness values for
that certain time-window are given. It does not provide any insights into how the
assortment of cooperators is maintained (see also the discussion in Section 5).
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The dilemma of cooperation
Figure 3: Selection on two-levels in group-structured populations. (a) A population with
individuals belonging to different groups (sub-populations). (b) For the dilemma of cooperation,
selection within the sub-populations selects for free-riders while competition between groups
selects for more cooperative groups. In the multi-level view of selection, intra-group evolution
selects for free-riders, while inter-group evolution selects for cooperative behavior. (c-e). The
outcome depends on the exact comparison of both selection processes. Here one example is
shown, following the two-level Price equation approach (details in Appendix B). (c) and (d),
exemplary fitness on the group-level and the evolutionary dynamics within each group depend
on the fraction of cooperators within the groups (Zα). (e) Consider an initial distribution of the
fraction of cooperators within groups (black line, average shown as dashed line). This distribution
changes according to the selection dynamics within groups and the competition between groups.
If only selection between groups is considered, then one obtains the new distribution shown in blue
in (e): cooperation increases within each group and on average. If only selection within groups
is considered, the new distribution is shown red in (e): cooperation decreases within each group
and on average. The total outcome considering both levels is shown in green: while cooperation
decreases within each group, the average level of cooperation still increases. Thus, population
structure can promote cooperation. However, this example also illustrates that selection within
groups leads to a lower level of cooperation within each group. For cooperation to be stably
maintained additional mechanisms are thus required to keep cooperation levels within groups
high. Thus, to understand the evolutionary stability of cooperation, more specific considerations
are required, going beyond the abstract considerations of the Price equation, multi-level selection
or inclusive fitness. Adapted from Ref. [56].
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For a real understanding of the mechanisms promoting assortment cooperation
in a specific situation, one has to specifically consider the different biological and
ecological aspects at play.
Finally, given this context of Hamilton’s rule, we also think that the ongoing
debate between proponents of the group- and kin-selection frameworks is not very
fruitful. This includes for example more recent debates on the role of inclusive
fitness, e.g. [266, 29, 84, 325, 146, 273, 267]. Within their general formula-
tions, multi-level selection and inclusive fitness calculations are mathematically
equivalent (see discussion above and [207, 344]), and they attempt to describe
evolution on the same, very generic level. Differences are merely in the emphasis
on different terms (for example relatedness or groups). There are several recent
reviews on the general state of the debate, e.g. [367, 378, 366, 379, 91, 26], so
we just mention how much in our opinion both theories resembles each other.
While group-selection focuses on structure to explain cooperation, kin-selection
focuses on relatedness as the reason for cooperative behaviour. But actually re-
latedness as well as structure are necessary for both, which therefore strongly
resemble each other: On the one hand, groups can only favor cooperation if some
of them have a higher level of cooperators and thereby a selection advantage
compared to other groups. In terms of kin-selection this differences in the group
composition correspond to a relatedness.
On the other hand, the relatedness, as we have learned from Hamilton’s rule,
is not an absolute value (like a difference in the genome) but depends on the
variance in the composition of all sub-populations. Thereby also structure is es-
sential for this quantity. Crucially, both frame-works need additional mechanisms
to ensure a stable high level of relatedness (or the existence of more cooperative
groups). Without such a mechanisms, the difference in groups (or relatedness)
declines over time as populations in sub-populations fixate and non-cooperators
dominate. Thus, to understand these mechanisms, we have to leave the general
formulations of kin- and group-selection, and study more specifically the evo-
lutionary dynamics for the (microbial) populations we are interested in. What
are the microscopic reasons leading to an (inclusive) fitness and group structures
favouring cooperation? What are the dynamic processes underlying both frame-
works? How can cooperative behaviour have emerged in the first place? These
and many other questions still lack a satisfactory answer.
7. Pyoverdine - a public good in pseudomonas populations
Prominent examples of cooperatingmicrobes are siderophore-producing pseu-
domonads, with the best known group of siderophores being the fluorescent
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peptidic pyoverdines [37, 52, 42, 296]. Pyoverdines serve as iron-scavenging
pigments and thereby enable cells to uptake iron, an essential element for almost
every living organism, including pseudomonads [42]. We here discuss the biol-
ogy of pyoverdines in more detail as we will use it as an example to illustrate how
the regulatory control of public good production and their chemical properties are
important to consider. As explained in more detail in Section 7.1, the production
of siderophores is a cooperative trait. It is beneficial for a population growing
under iron-limiting conditions: wild-type pyoverdine producers grow faster and
reach higher population densities than related non-producers, when strains are
grown individually. It is metabolically costly to the producer, and siderophores
can be utilized by producers and non-producers [121, 199, 200]. As a conse-
quence, a social dilemma arises since non-producers have a growth advantage
compared to producers when grown in mixed culture.15
There are additional aspects of siderophore production which make it a versa-
tile model system to study the influence of ecological and environmental factors
on the maintenance and evolution of cooperation. First, the metabolic load
put on the production of siderophores can be regulated by the amount of avail-
able iron [53, 155]. In fact, in P. aeruginosa pyoverdine production decreases
with increasing iron concentrations and ceases completely under high iron sup-
plementation (FeCl3 ≥ 50µM) [201, 208]. Second, siderophore production is
down-regulated in pyoverdine-rich environments [198]. Third, pyoverdines are
fluorescent and can therefore be measured to high accuracy. This property allows
also easy discrimination of producers and non-producers after co-cultivation. Fi-
nally, fluorescent pseudomonads are of great importance in medicine (e.g. lung
infections by Pseudomonas aeruginosa [277] and for bioremediation (e.g. Pseu-
domonas putida colonizing plant roots) [240]. Therefore, a better understanding
of the role of population dynamics including competition and development of
heterogeneity during colonisation of the respective environments is expected to
support development of new strategies of medical therapy as well as of environ-
mental protection.
In the following, we give a more detailed account of the regulatory network
of pyoverdine synthesis and secretion and review recent progress in establishing
Pseudomonas putida as a model system to systematically study cooperation in
bacterial populations. We will use this information in the following section to
15As we noted already in Section 4.1, there are several other examples for public goods in
microbial systems, e.g. sticky polymers connecting a microbial colony as observed with P.
fluorescens [284] or invertases hydrolysing disaccharides into monosaccharides in the budding
yeast Saccaromyces cerevisiae [120, 118, 222].
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construct a mathematical model for populations containing producing and non-
producing strains. There, we will examine how the biological details discussed in
this section are important to take into account when considering the evolutionary
dynamics of public good production.
7.1. Biological and biochemical characterisation of pyoverdines
Siderophores are organic compounds that are synthesised and secreted by
bacteria into the environment to scavenge ferric iron when it becomes scarce.
The resulting iron-siderophore complexes are taken up by the bacteria, and iron
is incorporated into bacterial proteins [32, 52, 237]. Iron is a cofactor of different
enzymes of central metabolic pathways and involved mainly in redox reactions
(e.g., of the respiratory chain). The described strategy of iron acquisition is thus
essential for bacterial growth and survival in many native habitats since ferric iron
has a very low solubility and is bound to proteins in hosts [32, 52]. For example,
fluorescent pseudomonads produce a group of siderophores called pyoverdines
(as mentioned before) that are crucial for colonization of other organisms includ-
ing plants, animals, and humans by pathogenic and non-pathogenicPseudomonas
strains [237]. Besides iron acquisition, pyoverdines are involved in the resis-
tance against heavy metals [308] and oxidative stress [162], and interactions of
ferri-pyoverdine complexes with other redox active compounds can provide ac-
cess to phosphates, trace metals, and organic compounds in minerals [281, 391].
Pyoverdines are composed of three different components: (i) a dihydroxychino-
line chromophore that is responsible for the fluorescence of the molecule, (ii)
an acyl side-chain bound to carbon 3 of the chromophore, and (iii) a peptide
moiety (6-14 amino acids) that is strain specific [42, 296]. The production of the
pyoverdine starts in the cytosol with the synthesis of a precursor (ferribactin) by
non-ribosomal peptide synthases [246]. After transport into the periplasm by an
ABC transporter, the precursor is modified to yield mature fluorescent pyover-
dine [296]. The latter is secreted into the extracellular environment by tripartite
efflux pumps belonging to the ABC and RND classes of transporters [143, 135]
(Fig. 4).
The pyoverdine synthesis and secretion system. Synthesis and secretion of py-
overdine is estimated to require 26 high energy phosphates [316]. Up to 15% of
the ATP necessary to synthesize all constituents of a bacterial cell are estimated
to be invested in pyoverdine production [316]. Major cost saving strategies of
pseudomonads involve recycling of pyoverdine as well as a tight regulation of py-
overdine production. Importantly, once synthesized, pyoverdine is not consumed
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Figure 4: Model of pyoverdine synthesis, secretion, uptake and recycling in pseudomonads.
Non-ribosomal peptide synthetases (NRPS) produce a peptide precursor (red pentagon) that is
further modified and acylated at its N terminus [296]. All the enzymes seem to form a large
complex termed siderosome that is associated with the inner leaflet of the cytoplasmic membrane
(CM) preferentially at cell poles [111, 156]. The resulting precursor is transported across the CM
most likely by the ABC transporter PvdE [390]. Various periplasmic enzymes (e.g., PvdN, PvdO,
PvdP, PvdQ) participate in further modifications and chromophore formation to finally yield ma-
ture fluorescent pyoverdine [296]. Transport of newly synthesized pyoverdine from the periplasm
across the outer membrane (OM) is suggested to involve PvdRT-OpmQ, a tripartite efflux pump
of the ATP-binding-cassette (ABC)-type [135]. Recently, also the resistance-nodulation-division
(RND)-type efflux pumps MdtABC-OpmB has been implicated in the process [143]. Secreted
pyoverdine binds Fe3+ in the environment, and the pyoverdine-Fe3+ complex is transported
back into the periplasm by the OM receptor FpvA in a TonB-dependent manner [155]. Fe3+
is reduced to Fe2+ by the FpvGHJK complex, released from pyoverdine and via the binding
proteins FpvC/FpvF and the ABC transporter complex FpvD/FpvE transported into the cyto-
plasm [106, 33]. The remaining pyoverdine is transported back to the extracellular space to
capture more iron [155].
but recycled. After uptake of the pyoverdine-Fe complex into the periplasm, fer-
ric iron is reduced and released from the siderophore. To capture more iron, the
latter is pumped back into the environment probably by the same efflux pumps
that translocate newly synthesized pyoverdine [135, 155] (Fig. 4). The central
element of the regulatory network is the ferric uptake regulator (Fur) protein,
an intracellular iron sensor repressing the synthesis of transcriptional activators
of the iron acquisition system in its iron bound form. Under conditions of iron
limitation, Fur is released from target promoters leading to the expression of a
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set of sigma factors [53]. PvdS is one of these sigma factors and functions as ac-
tivator of pyoverdine synthesis gene expression [45, 218]. This function of PvdS
is inhibited by the anti-sigma factor FpvR which is located in the inner mem-
brane and interacts with the outer membrane receptor FpvA. Binding of external
pyoverdine-Fe to the receptor alters the protein-protein interactions and leads to
the release of PvdS and stimulation of the expression of pyoverdine synthesis
genes [45, 218]. By this means, pseudomonads can steadily adapt expression of
pyoverdine synthesis genes to changing environmental conditions.
Pyoverdines represent public goods. When secreted into the environment, py-
overdines are expected to be used by producing (cooperators) and non-producing
cells (free-riders) [364] (Fig. 5). Indeed, it has been shown experimentally
that secreted pyoverdine simultaneously supports growth of producers and non-
producers under iron depletion (see e.g. Refs. [202]). However, conditions
inhibiting diffusion of pyoverdine such as spatial restrictions, high medium vis-
cosity or other not well-mixed settings may prevent homogenous spreading over
the entire population and support a (partially) private use of it [69]. For example,
cell-cell contacts have been shown to confine public diffusion in P. aeruginosa
microcolonies [163]. Furthermore, it has been shown thatP. aeruginosa regulates
the secretion of iron-scavenging siderophores in the presence of environmental
stresses, reserving this public good for private use in protection against reactive
oxygen species when under stress [162]. Consequently, if pyoverdine is consid-
ered a public good, detailed environmental conditions must be taken into account.
In particular, costs and benefit of pyoverdine as a public good cannot simply be
described with two parameters, as one typically do in evolutionary game theory
(Section 5.3).
7.2. Pseudomonas putida as an experimental model system
As shown recently [24], the soil bacterium P. putida KT2440 is a versa-
tile experimental model systems to investigate the social role of public goods.
The main advantage of this system is that it synthesises only a single type of
siderophore [223] mediating all cell-cell interactions, and does not produce any
known quorum-sensing molecules that might otherwise interfere with the so-
cial interaction [72, 260, 53]. Wild-type P. putida KT2440 controls pyoverdine
production through a complex regulatory network, as explained in the previ-
ous section. It allows cells to continually adapt their pyoverdine production to
the availability of iron [223, 329]. From the perspective of designing a well-
controlled experimental model system, this regulation represents a downside, as
it obscures the costs of pyoverdine production by affecting other processes. One
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Figure 5: Pyoverdine acts as a public good. pyoverdine is produced by a cooperator (yellow)
and secreted to the extracellular space where it can bind iron (Fe3+). The complex is recognised
and internalised by both producer and non-producer (green), even when the latter one does not pay
the cost of its production (selection advantage). In the periplasm, iron is released and pyoverdine
is transported back to the extracellular space to repeat the cycle (siderophore recycling).
way to circumvent this is to generate strains that constitutively produce pyover-
dine (e.g., P. putida KP1) [24] and study populations where this strain competes
against a non-producer strain carrying, e.g., an inactivated non-ribosomal peptide
synthetase gene that inhibits pyoverdine synthesis and is otherwise isogenic (e.g.,
P. putida 3E2) [223].
To quantify the beneficial and cooperative role of pyoverdine, i.e. its impact
on population dynamics, one has to determine the metabolic load of pyoverdine
production, its contribution to growth, its stability, and how evenly it is shared
with other cells. As shown in Fig. 6 (adapted from Ref. [24]) and discussed in the
previous section, there is a cost associated with pyoverdine production. The costs
were estimated by comparing growth of the constitutive producer with wild-
type and non-producer under iron-replete conditions (Fig. 6a, solid symbols).
Depending on growth conditions, the growth rate of the constitutive producer
was 3-10% lower than the growth rates of the two other strains.
In addition, the benefit of pyoverdinewas quantified by growing non-producers
alone in iron-depleted medium, in which cells need pyoverdine to grow. As
shown in Fig. 6b, the growth rate increases almost linearly with the concentration
of added pyoverdine, and then sharply, at a threshold concentration psat ≈ 1µM,
levels off at a maximal growth rate µmax, whose value depends on other provided
culture conditions. To a very good degree of accuracy one has (see gray curve in
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Figure 6: Characterization of the fitness impact of pyoverdine. (a) In an environment with
available iron (solid symbols), non-producer cells (strain 3E2, squares) grow as fast as the wild-
type (WT, diamonds), and faster than constitutive producers (strain KP1, circles). Under extreme
iron limitation, pyoverdine is needed for growth: producers (and the wild-type) grow, whereas
non-producers are unable to. negative control (n.c. , medium without P. putida strains) is shown
for comparison. (b) Growth benefit from pyoverdine. Green dots represent the growth rate µ
of non-producer cultures, with added pyoverdine. The solid gray line represents the growth rate
calculated using equation (24) (with fitted maximal growth rate µmax = 0.878 and saturation
concentration psat = 0.8. (c) Sharing and excludability. In mixed populations, and under extreme
iron limitation, producers (KP1, blue line) and non-producers (3E2, orange line) start growth to-
gether. Since non-producers need pyoverdine to grow (see panel b), we conclude that pyoverdine
is equally shared between the strains: it is non-excludable. (d) Durability of pyoverdine. Fluo-
rescence of pyoverdine in growth medium, with and without non-producer bacteria. Pyoverdine
does not degrade spontaneously or through interaction with bacteria. Reprinted from Ref. [24].
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Fig. 6b)
µ(p) =
{
µmax
psat
, p < psat
µmax p ≥ psat
. (18)
A good is dubbed excludable if producers are able to prevent non-producers
from accessing it [9]. This can be tested by cultivating producers and non-
producers together in iron-depleted conditions and measure when each strain
would start growing. Figure 6c shows that after an initial lag phase both strains
initiate growth essentially at the same time. Since pyoverdine is absolutely
necessary for growth in these conditions, this implies that both strains have equal
access to it. In other words, pyoverdine acts as a non-excludable good.
Finally, Figure 6d shows that pyoverdine is fluorescent for at least ∼ 48 hours,
and hence for all practical purposes it does not degrade spontaneously or through
interactions with cells. Therefore, while bacteria interact with pyoverdine, they
do not appear to damage or degrade it.
Taken together, these observations characterise pyoverdine as a proper public
good and show that producers incur a constant cost under given growth conditions.
Moreover, due to its very long lifetime, pyoverdine accumulates in the envi-
ronment once produced. In Sections 8.3 we consider the consequences of these
properties of a public good on the emergence and stability of cooperative be-
havior. However, we first talk more about the general requirements for stable
cooperation to emerge in structured microbial populations.
8. Selection and drift in structured (meta-)populations
As we have outlined in Sections 1.2, microbes live in structured populations
where they exhibit periods of strong growth and periods of dynamic restructur-
ing. Theoretical studies suggest that such a population structure might promote
the stability of cooperation (Section 3.1). Indeed, experimental studies under
well controlled experimental conditions have confirmed this by investigating the
consequences of different population structures for a range of bacterial sytems
(Section 4). To conceptually analyse microbial population structures consider a
life cycle model consisting of three steps [59] as illustrated in Fig. 7.
(i) Group-formation step: initially, a well-mixed population consisting of co-
operators and non-cooperating defectors (free-riders) is randomly assorted
into different groups (colonies).
(ii) Group-evolution step: next, each of the so formed groups evolves indepen-
dently and separately following a growth law that is specific to themicrobial
system under consideration.
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(iii) Group-merging step: the life cycle starts anew after some time T when the
colonies are merged together into one population.
formation
of colonies
separate evolution
 of 
each colony
initially 
well-mixed
population
cooperator
free-rider
Figure 7: A simplified life cycle of microbial populations. This figure illustrates the simplified
life cycle of a bacterial population consisting of cooperators (blue) and free-riders (red). There
are three essential time periods: i) Initially, a well-mixed population is subdivided into groups of
average size n0 by some stochastic process. ii) Once these groups are formed, they independently
and separately evolve according to a dynamics that has the following two key features. First,
groups with a higher cooperator fraction grow faster as they contain more public good. Second,
because free-riders do not have to provide the public good, they are growing faster than cooperators
within each of these groups. iii) Finally, after some time T the life cycle starts anew as all groups
are merged into a single population. Adapted from Ref. [232].
This scheme closely follows controlled laboratory experiments [46, 47], see
the discussion in Section 4. The idealized scheme aswell as these experiments are
obviously simplifications of the complex arrangement, growth, and restructuring
patterns which are happening in the wild. However, they both capture major
aspects of microbial growth. In particular, they capture the key feature of regu-
larly occurring population bottlenecks, namely rearranging local sub-populations
(colonies) whose initial population size consists of only a few individuals; see
also the discussion in Section 2. Furthermore, as the random assortment of
individuals constitutes a worst-case scenario for cooperation (no preferential as-
sortment of cooperators with other cooperators), it allows to study the minimal
conditions for the possible onset of cooperation in microbial populations starting
from a single cooperative mutant [232].
In the following subsections, we will first discuss the group formation and
group evolution steps in systems where random drift dominates and selection
effects can be neglected. Next, we will review recent theoretical and experimental
results on the combined effect of assortment noise, demographic noise, and
selection pressure by public good production. Finally, in the last subsection,
we give an overview on theoretical results showing that cooperation can be
maintained in systems running repeatedly through a life cycles where all of the
above three steps are repeated cyclically.
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Figure 8: Urn sampling and growth. (a) Schematic illustration of the random initial conditions.
Sub-populations are initiated by repeatedly taking small volumes, containing a small number of
cells, from a large reservoir containing a dilute mixture of two strains of bacteria, A and B,
indicated by marbles of different color. The fraction of A strains is given by x¯0. This sampling
process implies that the initial number of individuals in the sub-populations follows a Poisson
distribution, as specified in the main text. (b) Illustration of the Pólya urn model. The urn model
is a stochastic process where marbles of two different colors are repeatedly drawn at random with
a probability given by their relative abundances. After drawing they are returned back together
with a second marble of the same color. In order to create a process exhibiting exponential growth
one has to choose the waiting time between successive iterations to be exponentially distributed
(Poissonization). Adapted from Ref. [371].
8.1. Random drift in growing bacterial populations
In Section 5.4 we discussed the role of (demographic) noise in populations of
constant size. The main point was that the strength of demographic noise scales
inversely with the population size N . As a consequence, when the population size
is changing, non-selective effects are dominant over selective effects when the
population size is small. However, these non-selective effects become more and
more sub-dominant with increasing population size. This raises the important
question of how the interplay between demographic noise and population growth
affects the composition of initially small populations and how these results differ
from systems with large populations of fixed size. In this section, we review
recent results for systems which are neutral, i.e. where selection is completely
absent (no public good production and strains show similar growth behavior).
This analysis will also be important when we consider the case with selection.
Pyoverdine production by P. putida KT2440 was recently used as a model to
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study such neutral dynamics [371]. Co-cultures of P. putida KT2440 (wild type
strain) and an isogenic mutant (non-producer, 3E2) were mixed, diluted to yield
different sub-populations with Poisson distributed initial composition, and grown
under high iron conditions. Under these conditions, KT2440 is not producing
pyoverdine and both strains show similar growth behavior (see Section 7). With
this setup, the dynamics of different sub-populations with a random distribution
of initial cell numbers N0 and producer fraction x0 can be studied, as illustrated in
Fig. 8. The experimental setting just described is equivalent to the classic Pólya
urn model [78] if one identifies marbles in the urn with bacteria in a well-mixed
well. In its most basic formulation [78], sketched in Fig. 8b, this model describes
an urn containing N marbles of two different colours. At each step, a marble
is drawn at random, and then placed back, alongside another one of the same
color. This way the urn grows in size at each step. Each marble is equally likely
to be drawn, therefore the probability of extracting a marble of a certain color is
equal to the relative abundance of marbles of that color in the urn, for example,
Prob{“extract red”} = NA/(NA + NB). Every extraction adds a marble to the
same color to the urn, thus increasing the chance of drawing further marbles
of that same color in the future. Therefore, the Pólya urn is a self-reinforcing
(or auto-catalytic) process [12, 278]. One could intuitively expect this positive
feedback to amplify each small initial fluctuation. As more and more marbles of
the same color are drawn, it becomes more and more likely to extract that color,
and eventually the urn would come arbitrarily close to being homogeneous. In
biological terms, this corresponds to an almost fixated population, analogous to
the result of genetic drift. At the same time, however, the increasing number
of marbles decreases the impact of individual fluctuations. Each added marble
changes the proportions in the urn less than the previous one.
Mathematical and experimental studies [371] using different initial conditions
(Fig. 9), i.e. different combinations of the initial average population size N¯0 and
composition x¯0, have lead to the following insights: (i) Fixation of a population
is not due to fixation during population growth but simply a consequence of the
initial sampling process. For small average initial population size or compositions
close to x = 0 or x = 1, this effect is strongest. Here a large fraction of the wells
initially contain cells of strain A or B only; see Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 9(d). (ii)
The composition of the population approaches a random stationary limit, i.e.
the probability distribution for the population composition converges to limit
distributions (Fig. 9), which are distinct from Kimura’s result for populations
with a constant population size [178].
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Figure 9: Steady-state distributions of population composition are shown for both experi-
ments (bars) and theoretical model for a series of different initial conditions. The averages x0
and N0 determined from the experiment (using 120 independent wells) were used to initialize
the stochastic simulations for a set of 120-well ensembles. The blue solid line indicates that
average theoretical distribution obtained from averaging the histograms obtained from these set
of ensembles after growth. The shaded areas show confidence intervals: 68% (between dashed
lines), 95% (between dotted lines) and 99.73%. The parameter values, also indicated in the graph
are: (a) N¯0 = 2.9, x¯0 = 0.32; (b) N¯0 = 18.4, x¯0 = 0.22; (c) N¯0 = 19.6, x¯0 = 0.52; (d) N¯0 = 14.5,
x¯0 = 0.71. Adapted from Ref. [371].
8.2. Evolutionary game theory in growing populations
What happens if the dynamics is not neutral butmetabolic costs for the produc-
tion of the public good are significant? In this section, we will discuss a recently
introduced generalized game theory framework which enables one to consider
the combined effect of internal population dynamics and changes in population
size [231, 59]. In this theory one starts with a stochastic model where individual
agents reproduce or die with rates that depend on the state of the population,
instead of by winning a ‘tooth-and-claw’ battle with an opponent where one’s
survival directly results in the death of the opponent. This has conceptual advan-
tages as it allows a more biological interpretation of evolutionary dynamics than
common formulations using the Fisher-Wright or Moran process [81, 28, 244].
In the simplest setting, one considers an ensemble of subpopulations with
only two different traits: each individual may either be a cooperator and defector
(free-rider) [231, 59]. The state of each sub-population i is defined by the
number of cooperators, N (i)C , and defectors, N
(i)
D , or equivalently, the total number
of individuals, N (i) = N (i)C + N
(i)
D , and the fraction of cooperators, xi = N
(i)
C /N (i).
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The stochastic population dynamics is defined by birth (A → 2A) and death
(A→ ∅) rates for each trait A ∈ {C,D}
ΓA→2A = µ(x) fA(x) NA , (19a)
ΓA→∅ = d(N) NA . (19b)
The quantity fA(x) denotes the fitness (growth advantage or disadvantage) for each
of the strains, and in the simplest case is given by fC = 1 − s and fD = 1, where
s denotes the cost for cooperation, e.g. by production of a common good like
siderophores. Importantly, cooperation positively affects the whole population
by increasing its global fitness. Hence, one assumes that the population growth
rate µ(x) increases with the cooperator fraction x. In its simplest form it is often
taken as linear µ(x) = 1 + px where p is an effective parameter characterising
the growth advantage of populations containing a larger amount of cooperators.
For instance, for P. aeruginosa, as discussed in Section 7, the iron uptake, and
hence the birth rates, increase with a higher siderophore density and therefore
with a higher fraction of cooperators, see Fig. 6b. In general, µ(x) may also be a
nonlinear function of x, as e.g. found in Ref. [118]. The specific choice depends
on the particular biological system under consideration. The per capita death
rate d(N) = N/K models logistic growth with carrying capacity K accounting
for limited resources.
Deterministic population dynamics. Neglecting any kind of demographic
noise, the time evolution of the populationwould be given by a set of deterministic
equations – also called mean-field equations – for the average population size, N ,
and the average cooperator fraction, x, respectively:
∂tN =
(
µ(x) − N
K
)
N , (20a)
∂t x = −s µ(x) x(1 − x) . (20b)
Here, the dynamics for the internal composition of the population reduces to the
common game theory scenario [244, 264, 345], where a changing population size
is immaterial to the evolutionary outcome of the dynamics [28]. Therefore, the
average fraction of cooperators x would decrease monotonously in time as shown
by the black curve in Fig. 10b. The coupling between population dynamics and
internal dynamics merely leads to an overshoot in the population size N , as shown
in Fig. 10a.
The role of demographic noise. The internal dynamics becomes qualitatively
different if demographic noise is accounted for [231, 59]. In principle, there
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are two possible sources of noise: extrinsic noise due to random assortment of
individuals into subpopulations as discussed in the previous section and intrin-
sic noise due to demographic noise. Here, we focus on the latter. However,
similar results are obtained when considering extrinsic noise or both types of
randomness [59, 232]. We will come back to this later, and for now consider a
(large) set of subpopulations, all of the same initial size, N0, and the same initial
internal composition (initial cooperator fraction), x0. As shown in Fig. 10b, one
finds a transient increase in the average fraction of cooperators. This shows that
demographic noise during population bottlenecks can lead to a finite time period
tC where the cooperator fraction rises above its initial value x0 such that during
this time period the selection disadvantage of cooperators is overcome. Since
the strength of demographic noise scales as
√
1/N [28, 179, 62], the duration of
the corresponding cooperation time tC strongly depends on the initial population
size N0 [231, 59]. Importantly, the transient increase in cooperator fraction is
a genuine stochastic effect which is not captured by the deterministic equations,
Eq. (20). It is caused by the amplification of stochastic fluctuations during the
initial phase of the population dynamics where the population size is still small.
During this phase, demographic noise is strong and cooperator fractions will be
widely different in the various subpopulations. There is an asymmetry in the am-
plification of stochastic fluctuations because of the coupling between population
growth and its internal composition. While an additional cooperator amplifies
the growth of a population, an additional defector has just the opposite effect.
This implies an asymmetric amplification of demographic favouring those sub-
population in an ensemble that contain a larger cooperator fraction [231]. As a
consequence, the ensemble average
x(t) =
∑
i N
(i)
C (t)∑
i N (i)(t)
, (21)
i.e. the mean fraction of cooperators obtained when averaging over different
realisations i, may show an increases with time. This effect is only transient
as with growing population size the selection pressure towards more defectors
becomes dominant [231, 59].
Taken together, the main insight gained from these studies of the prisoner’s
dilemma is that demographic noise can result into a fluctuation-induced transient
increase of cooperation. An essential prerequisite for this stochastic effect is the
presence of a positive correlation between global population fitness and the level
of cooperation.
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Figure 10: Transient increase in cooperation. The figures show the temporal evolution of
the average population size 〈N〉 and the cooperator fraction 〈x〉 = ∑i N (i)C (t)/∑i N (i)(t) averaged
over the ensemble of all subpopulations. (a) Average population size. The results obtained from
the stochastic simulations for N0 = 4 (red line) agree well with the approximation obtained from
the deterministic equations (black line). The initial rise and subsequent decline of the population
size is due to logistic growth and a decrease in carrying capacity due to selection, respectively.
(b) The fraction of cooperators. As described in the main text, the initial increase results from
an asymmetric amplification of fluctuations, and the subsequent decline is due to selection. The
cooperation time tC is defined as the initial time period where the cooperator fraction x lies above
its initial value x0. This effect is stochastic and not accounted for by a deterministic theory (black
line). Initial population sizes are indicated in the graph. Other parameters used in the simulations
are s = 0.1 and p = 10. Adapted from Refs. [231, 59].
8.3. The role of explicit public goods
Theoretical models of public good exchange, like the one we discussed in
the previous section, typically leave social interactions implicit and formulated
in terms of game-theory models [98, 118, 148, 292, 293, 294] or inclusive
fitness models [121, 199, 262, 163]. As discussed in Section 5.3, a paradigmatic
example is the prisoner’s dilemmagame [14, 64, 95, 133]. While these approaches
provide important conceptual insights, it is now becoming increasingly clear that
a more detailed molecular view on public goods is necessary to quantitatively
understand the population dynamics of bacterial systems. Possible effects include
the diffusion of public goods [163, 203, 69], a regulatory role of public good
production [222], the interference of different public goods with each other [157],
and the function of public goods in inter-species competition [259].
Experimental model systems like Pseudomonas populations allow one to
study interactions between bacteria that involve the exchange of a public good,
specifically the iron-scavenging compound pyoverdine. Based on the experimen-
tal quantification of costs and benefits of pyoverdine production (see Section 7) it
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becomes possible to build quantitative theoretical models of population dynamics
that explicitly account for the changing significance of accumulating pyoverdine
as a chemical mediator of social interactions. Here, we review recent progress
made in understanding the role of public goods, particularly by studying pyover-
dine production in Pseudomonas putida as an experimental model system [24].
As discussed in detail in Section 7 and as sketched in Fig. 11(a), a single public
good (pyoverdine) mediates cell-cell interactions. To minimize complexity, the
model system contains two engineered strains, a strain (KP1) which constitu-
tively produces pyoverdine, and a non-producer strain (3E2). The experimental
setup, illustrated in Fig. 11(b), considers a metapopulation where individual
subpopulations were initialized as stochastic mixtures of the two strains. The
metapopulation consisted of a 96-well plate with each well representing a sub-
population (inoculated with about 104 cells). The stochastic sampling of the
strain composition in the subpopulations (wells) was chosen such that it mimics
the characteristic variability of small populations.
Figure 11b illustrates that samples were taken from each well at given set of
time points t, and then merged to determine the average cell number
〈N〉(t) = 1
M
M∑
i=1
(
N (i)C (t) + N (i)D (t)
)
(22)
and the mean producer fraction across the metapopulation
〈x〉(t) =
∑M
i=1 N
(i)
C (t)∑M
i=1
(
N (i)C (t) + N (i)D (t)
) . (23)
Mathematical model. Building a mathematical model of this experimental
model system has to be based on the known characteristics of the experimental
model system; see Fig. 11c. In particular, onemust take into account the availabil-
ity of pyoverdine and its effect on growth: (i) pyoverdine molecules find and bind
an iron atom as soon as they are released; (ii) cells absorb the bound pyoverdine-
iron complex at a constant rate; (iii) cells try as much as possible to maintain
their internal iron concentration constant (iron homeostasis); (iv) up to some
saturation concentration, iron is the only factor limiting growth. Mathematically,
this can can be integrated into a growth rate of the form (see Eq. 18)
µ(p) = µmax min
(
p
psat
, 1
)
, (24)
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Figure 11: Quantitative analysis of an experimental model population. (a) Sketch of the
interactions in the bacterial model system: Producers secrete pyoverdine, which binds to iron
in the medium. All cells (regardless of the strain) absorb the complex into their periplasm,
where it is separated: iron is transported inside the cell, whereas pyoverdine is secreted back
in the environment. (b) Sketch of the metapopulation experiment: Pure cultures are mixed in
stochastic proportions to inoculate the wells of a well-plate. This ensures that each well contains a
stochastic fraction of producers. Populations containing more producers (blue) benefit from their
more abundant pyoverdine and grow faster. (c) Road map to establish a mathematical model:
The main parameters of the interaction, such as costs and benefits of pyoverdine, are quantified
experimentally as discussed in Section 7. A single parameter (the synthesis rate of pyoverdine)
is left as a fit parameter. At given intervals, samples were taken from each well and then merged
to measure both the average population size and the global producer fraction. (d) Sketch of
Simpson’s paradox (adapted from Ref. [46]): Producer fractions within each population (blue
portions of the left pie charts) always decrease; however, as long as more producing populations
grow larger (larger pies), the global producer fraction across the ensemble (right pie chart) may
increase.
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where p denotes the concentration of pyoverdine, and psat represents the con-
centration at which iron availability stops being growth-limiting. Equation (24)
reflects the linear dependence of µ(p) on the pyoverdine concentration p as ob-
served in experiments (see Fig. 6b in Section 7). At the deterministic level16 of
description this implies the following growth relations for the amount of producer
cells NC and non-producers ND in a population [24].
∂tNC = µ(p) NC (1 − s)
(
1 − NC + ND
K
)
, (25a)
∂tND = µ(p) ND
(
1 − NC + ND
K
)
, (25b)
where producers are assumed to grow slower by a factor 1 − s because of the
cost of production. These growth relations account for finite nutrient supply
by the carrying capacity K (logistic growth). When the population exhausts
the resources in the environment (determined by a carrying capacity K), cells
end growth by entering a dormant state (see Section 5.5). Finally, the amount
of pyoverdine in the bacterial system is not constant, as producers synthesize
pyoverdine at a constant per-capita rate σ: ∂tp = σNC .
It is instructive to analyse the time evolution of the population size and com-
position of the population separately. To this end, it is convenient to consider the
rescaled variables n := (NC +ND)/K (how big the population is, compared to the
maximal size the environment allows), x := NC/(NC + ND) (the fraction of pro-
ducers in the population), and v := p/psat (how far the pyoverdine concentration
is from saturation concentration). Moreover, it is convenient to rescale time in
terms of the maximal growth rate µmax = µ(psat) and redefine µ(v) = min(v, 1).
Altogether, the population dynamics if described by the following rescaled equa-
tions:
∂tn = n µ(v) (1 − sx) (1 − n) , (26a)
∂t x = −s µ(v) x (1 − x) (1 − n) , (26b)
∂tv = α n x . (26c)
Here, α defines a (dimensionless) accumulation parameter
α :=
σ K
psat µmax
, (27)
16Experimental population started with ∼103 individuals and grew to a final size of ∼106,
justifying such deterministic description neglecting demographic noise.
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whichmeasures how fast pyoverdine accumulates compared to population growth.
High α corresponds to fast public good production, rapidly leading to high
pyoverdine concentration; low α means that cells reproduce much faster than
they can synthesise pyoverdine, which limits growth for long times.
Transient increase in producer fraction. In the experiments [24] the strains
were randomly assorted to the subpopulations (wells of a 96-well plate) as previ-
ously introduced. Starting with a well-mixed population containing a cooperator
fraction x0 one forms a set ofM groups (wells), where each of thesewells contains
a randomly chosen cooperator fraction x0. In these experiments the population
sizes were relatively large, starting already with around 103−104 individuals and
then growing to sizes with up to 107 cells. Hence, stochasticity in the initial size
is low such that one can assume that all populations have approximately the same
size. The statistical distribution of the cooperator fractions was determined from
the experimental data [24].
A typical trajectory resulting from the solution of the mathematical model,
Eq. (26b), using the experimentally determined initial conditions, is shown in
Fig. 12. One finds that over a broad parameter range, the population average in
the cooperator fraction, 〈x〉, shows a transient increase, i.e. it initially increases,
peaks at a value 〈x〉max before decreasing, and finally saturating to some station-
ary value. This characteristic profile can be rationalised as follows. The initial
growth rate of a subpopulation strongly correlates with the fraction of producers
it contains, thereby driving the increase in global producer fraction, in accordance
with the Price equation [231, 279, 280]. Over time, however, pyoverdine accu-
mulates in each subpopulation. As a consequence the benefit of pyoverdine to
individual cells will saturate, which in turn leads to a reduction in the advantage
producer-rich populations which they had during initial stages. At the same time,
subpopulations with few producers also accumulate enough of the public good
to start growing. Eventually, producer-rich populations enter the dormant phase,
and producer-poor ones catch up with their size. This implies that the increase in
the global producer fraction is only a transient phenomenon.
The amplitude of the transient increase ∆〈x〉 = 〈x〉max−〈x〉0 depends on both
the production cost s and the accumulation parameter α, as shown in Fig. 12b.
Clearly, a higher cost s, i.e. a heavier burden on producers, leads to less of an
increase in global producer fraction. The accumulation parameter α also reduces
∆〈x〉. Forα→ 0, in fact, pyoverdine is producedmuch slower than the population
growth. Scarce pyoverdine strictly limits growth for several generations, during
which only producer-rich populations can grow appreciably. Moreover, saturation
of the public good only happens rather later, allowing producer-rich populations
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Figure 12: Transient increase in global producer fraction. (a)Global producer fraction 〈x〉 as
a function of time obtained in simulations using parameter values α = 200, s = 0.05, n0 = 10−3.
Solving the deterministic equations for the population dynamics and averaging over the ensemble
of initial conditions one observes first an increase in the global producer fraction, which peaks
at a value 〈x〉max, then decreases (typically below its initial value) and eventually saturates to a
stationary long-term value. (b)Magnitude of the maximum producer increase ∆〈x〉 (colour code)
as function of the pyoverdine accumulation (parameter α) and the production cost s. Increasing
the production cost (horizontal axis, logarithmic scale) burdens producers, thus curtailing the
increase. The main advantage of producer populations is rooted in their faster growth. Higher
accumulation of pyoverdine (parameter α, vertical axis), however, leads to a faster saturation of
public good levels, reducing the marginal benefit of pyoverdine. It also leads to low-producer
sub-populations growing sooner. Both effects contribute to reduce the amplitude of the increase.
to maintain their growth advantage for long times, which leads to a high increase
in producer fraction. In contrast, for α  1, production and accumulation of
pyoverdine occur faster than cell replication. A few producers thus suffice to
rapidly accumulate enough public good to reach saturation. Hence, producer-
rich populations only briefly have an advantage, and the resulting increase is
lower.
Comparing the simulated transient increase with experiments confirms the
approach, see Fig. 13. The only fit parameter in the comparison between ex-
periments and simulations was the accumulation parameter α; all other model
parameters were inferred from the experimental data [24].
8.4. Microbial life cycles: maintenance and evolution of cooperation
Can such a transient increase in cooperator fraction lead to the evolution and
maintenance of cooperation? This question has recently been addressed for the
idealised restructuring scenario (life cycle) discussed in the introduction to this
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Figure 13: Comparison of theory and experiments. The average population size n, rescaled
to the final yield (or carrying capacity, (a), and the fraction of cooperators (b) observed experi-
mentally [24] is compared with the numerical solution of Eq. 26b (solid lines) for a set of values
for the production cost s ∈ {0.03, 0.05, 0.07}; the darker shades of blue indicate higher values
of s. The accumulation parameter α = 200 was obtained by fitting the numerical results to the
experimental data. Experimental error bars are the standard deviations of three to five replicates
of the experiment. Reprinted from Ref. [24].
section [59, 232]; see the illustration in Fig. 7. These studies have shown how the
population structure depends on two key parameters, the initial population size
n0 and the time between repeatedly regrouping the subpopulations (regrouping
time T). The main insight gained from these theoretical studies is that there
are two distinct mechanisms that can promote cooperation [59, 232]. (i) In the
group-fixation mechanism, the main effect is that during population bottlenecks
with a very small number of individuals a significant fraction of subpopulations
might fixate to purely cooperative colonies. (ii) In the group-growth mechanism,
cooperation is favored since subpopulations with a higher fraction of cooperators
grow comparably faster and thereby compensate for the selection advantage of
free-riders. In the following we review these mechanisms in more detail and
discuss the ensuing ‘phase diagram’ shown in Fig. 14.
Group-fixation mechanism. If the subpopulations (groups) evolve separately for
times much larger that the growth rate (T  1, time-scale growth-rate), it is likely
that all of them reach a stationary state, where the population has fixated to either
cooperators or free-riders. Since the corresponding groups sizes are then given
by (1 + p)(1 − s)K and K , respectively, the global fraction of cooperators will
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Figure 14: Life cycle phase diagram. Fate of the metapopulation under life cycle dynamics as
a function of the size of the population bottleneck n0 and the regrouping time T0; filled black
cricles are simulation results from Ref. [232]. For a single life cycle step, the initial cooperator
fraction x0 is mapped to a final cooperator fraction x(T). The resulting drift ∆x(x0) is shown
for four different scenarios (right panles): purely cooperative regime (n0 = 4, T = 1.5), bistable
regime where the map exhibits an unstable fixed point at 0 < x∗ < 1 (n0 = 5, T = 20), bistable
coexistence where the map has both a stable and an unstable fixed point (n0 = 4, T = 5.5), and
coexistence regime with a single stable fixed point at some intermediate value 0 < x∗ < 1 (n0 = 6,
T = 1.8). Adapated from Ref. [232].
change from its initial value x0 to [59, 232]
x′(x0) = (1 + p)(1 − s)PC(1 + p)(1 − s)PC + (1 − PC) . (28)
Here PC denotes the probability that a group after assortment consists of coop-
erators only [232]. This equation can be read as an iterative nonlinear map for
the cooperator fraction generated by the interplay between group evolution and
regrouping. As PC generically increases with the initial fraction of cooperators,
there is an unstable fixed point x∗u, which implies bistability in the composition
of the population as shown in Fig. 14. The final composition of the population
depends on the initial cooperator fraction x0. While for values above a threshold
fraction x∗u the final population consists of cooperators only, cooperators become
extinct in the long run if x0 < x∗u.
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Group-growth mechanism. Within groups the cooperator fraction always de-
clines due to the selective advantage of cooperators. However, groups containing
a larger fraction of cooperators grow stronger. This implies that more cooperative
groups (subpopulations) contribute with a larger weight to the metapopulation
average, an effect that is strongest during the initial growth phase of each subpop-
ulation. The relative strength of selection advantage of free-riders within groups,
s, and the growth advantage of more cooperative groups, p, is the decisive factor
that determines whether this mechanism is strong enough to compensate for the
selection disadvantage of cooperators [59, 232]. This group growth mechanism
leads to a stable cooperator fraction (fixed point) x∗S for life cycles with repeated
regrouping. A key insight is that the group-growth mechanism acts for much
stronger population bottlenecks, n0, than the group-fixation mechanism. The
underlying reason is that the mechanism relies on variance in group composition,
but not on the existence of purely cooperative groups. On the other hand, the
group-growth mechanism only works for short regrouping times because it is
caused by the initial growth advantage of more cooperative groups.
Phase diagram. The two key parameters of the life cycle model are the regroup-
ing time T , and the initial group size n0 (size of the population bottleneck). As
we have just discussed, these two parameters determine which of the two mech-
anisms, group-growth or group-fixation, are dominant. As shown in Fig. 14,
repeated regrouping leads to five distinct types of dynamics for the changes
∆x = x(T) − x0 in the cooperator fraction. As discussed in more detail in
Ref. [232], there is a bistable regime and a stable coexistence regime for pa-
rameters T and n0 where the group-fixation and the group-growth mechanism
dominates, respectively. Moreover, while at small groups sizes the metapop-
ulation becomes purely cooperative (due to group fixation events), free-riders
completely take over the metapopulation for large n0 and large regrouping times
(due to their selection advantage).
Overall these considerations show that the combination of reoccurring pop-
ulation bottlenecks and population growth can stabilize cooperative traits. The
continuous restructuring of the population can also allow the evolution of coop-
erative behavior when starting with a low fraction of cooperative individuals (in
the extreme case a single mutant) [232]. Details of public good synthesis and
utilization affect growth behavior and costs. This can shift the time-scales of
restructuring (T) and bottleneck sizes (N) required to stabilize cooperation.
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9. The public good dilemma in spatially extended systems
Up to now, we mostly discussed scenarios where local (sub)-populations are
well-mixed. However, the explicit consideration of space is an important aspect
of microbial life as many microbes on our planet occur in the form of dense
microbial communities like colonies and biofilms [251, 87], quite distinct from a
well-mixed scenario. Even more, spatial extension and arrangement can strongly
affect evolutionary dynamics [389]. In this section, we thus give a short overview
of experimental and theoretical work on the public good dilemma in spatially
extended systems.
9.1. Modeling cooperation in spatially extended systems
Aswediscussed in Section 3.1, Hamilton already argued that spatial clustering
of strains producing a public good (cooperators) may support cooperation popu-
lations [133]. In spatial clusters, cooperators can preferentially interact with each
other and thereby are less likely to be exploited by free-riders. Theoretically, this
idea has been studied early on byNowak, Bonhoeffer andMay in the context of the
spatial prisoner’s dilemmagame [263]. In this variant of the dilemma, individuals
are arranged on a lattice and only interact with their nearest neighbors. This class
of conceptual theoretical models has been explored quite thoroughly using a va-
riety of deterministic and stochastic interaction rules. These studies confirm that
formation of cooperative clusters can promote cooperation in such setups, see e.g.
Refs. [263, 254, 206, 332, 142, 102, 334, 216, 333, 4, 360]. Theoretical modeling
was also extended to more complex structures, beyond simple lattices, including
interactions in networks, see e.g. Refs. [269, 15, 154, 304, 1, 215, 331, 357]. In
fact, in many of these systems, stable cooperation was obtained. However, at the
same time, the stability of cooperation often depended on the exact details of the
underlying dynamical implementation of the cellular automatons and dynamical
systems studied.
In the context of microbes producing a diffusible public good, many specific
assumptions of these various models are probably unrealistic. Nevertheless, the
clustering of cooperation might lead to stable cooperation if one or both of the
following requirements are met (similarly to what we discussed in Section 3.1):
There is some positive assortment (spatial segregation) of cooperating individ-
uals [89] stably maintained over time, and the diffusible public good does not
spread out evenly in the whole population, but preferentially remains in producer-
rich areas [30]. Greater sharing of public goods leads in general to a reduction
of cooperation [234].
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9.2. Experimental studies with microbes
The dynamics of spatially extended populations is quite complex, even for
well-controlled and idealized experimental setups. There are various reasons for
this complexity: (i) Within the dense communities, strong consumption and
synthesis leads to strongly heterogeneous profiles of metabolites and waste-
products [341, 275, 87, 361]. (ii) Similar as in well-mixed systems, there is
a regulatory network that controls the production of public goods and other
exoproducts like, for instance, quorum sensing molecules; see discussion in
Section 7. (iii) This leads to an intricate coupling and feedback between the
environment shaped by the production of these products and the microbes grow-
ing in this self-shaped environment, sometimes referred to as eco-evolutionary
feedback [302, 22]. Differential motility and growth of microbes, growth of
the microbial colony as a whole (range expansion), and externally imposed spa-
tial and temporal variations of the environment are some other factors that in
combination with regulatory feedback lead to a complex intertwined dynam-
ics. Nevertheless, experiments performed under controlled laboratory conditions
have led to considerable insights into cooperation within such communities.
Range expansion. Range expansion refers to the growth of a population into a
previously unoccupied territory and is supposed to occur in response to changes
in the environment. This type of population growth can have a major effect on the
spatial arrangement and the composition of the population [129, 191, 130, 197,
192, 190, 314, 103, 362, 295, 119]. For example, monoclonal sectoring patterns
that arise as a consequence of random genetic drift drives population differentia-
tion along the expanding fronts of bacterial colonies [129, 191]. This segregation
process strongly favors cooperation in a yeast population emulating a prisoner’s
dilemma game [350], affects mutualism in yeast colonies [248, 241, 242, 234],
and promotes biodiversity in an E. coli system with cyclic dominance between
strains [362]. Moreover, genetic drift at expanding fronts can also lead to full fix-
ation of certain strains [82, 191]. Using a yeast model system [118] and a spatially
extended setup that emulates a stepping stone model [180, 191, 193, 190], it was
found that cooperation can be maintained through enrichment of cooperators at
the front [314].Recently, it was shown that the inevitable mechanical interactions
between cells can also significantly affect the fitness of cells at the expanding
edge of yeast colonies [168].
Biofilms. Biofilms have become a particular focus of recent research [194, 74,
251, 87], not only because of their high abundance in nature and their rele-
vance in understanding the role of cooperativity and competitive cell-cell in-
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teractions [194, 251] but also as model systems for studying the evolution of
multi-species communities in general, including the division of labor [73] and
the interaction with phages, their important predators [356]. From experimental
studies on biofilms a multitude of effects, often physical by nature, have been
identified to contribute to the maintenance of cooperation. Biofilm thickness has
been shown to limit the dispersal of public good confining it to producer-rich
regions, and thereby promoting cooperation [74]. In microcolonies of P. aerug-
inosa growing on solid substrates, there is evidence that pyoverdine is directly
exchanged between neighboring cells rather than by global diffusion [163]. In
experimental populations of P. fluorescens, cooperating groups are formed by
over-production of an adhesive polymer, which causes the interests of individuals
to align with those of the group [284]. This is by far not an exhaustive list of such
physical mechanisms; others are discussed in recent review articles [147, 10, 41].
Artificial spatially extended microhabitats. There have also been advances in de-
signing artificial spatially extended habitats using microfluidic devices which
allow to experimentally control the size of communities (patches) and how
strongly these couple to neighboring communities [175, 174, 149]. Using an
E. coli community that emulates a ‘social’ interaction between cooperators and
free-riders [149], coexistence of both strains was observed if there is some kind of
spatial organization. For the future, it would be interesting to have experimental
studies along theses lines. This may allow to learn how additional effects of
phenotypic heterogeneity and plasticity, the dynamics and regulation of public
goods, and phenotypic heterogeneity in the bacteria’s mobility favor or disfavor
the emergence of cooperative behavior in microbial model populations.
9.3. The role of bacterial motility in spatially extended systems
For most of the experimental conditions employed in the studies discussed
in the previous section (with the exception of artificial microhabitats), active
motility of the microbes can be disregarded. However, many microbes have
sophisticated mechanisms to actively move, and this motility can strongly chal-
lenge the evolutionary stability of cooperation. It is thus important, to consider
the interplay of motility and the emergence of cooperative behavior.
Already undirected movements (e.g. diffusion), can foster the invasion of
free-riders into cooperative clusters and thereby counteracts the evolution of
cooperation. How fragile this spatially promoted maintenance of cooperative
behavior can be has been illustrated by a theoretical study that takes into account
two essential features of microbial populations: motile behavior and its inter-
play with the processes of fitness collection and selection that happen on vastly
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different time scales [112]. While stable cooperation emerges without motile
behavior, as has been reported for the spatial prisoner’s dilemma [263] (see also
Section 9.1), it is found that even small diffusivemotility strongly restricts cooper-
ation since it enables non-cooperative individuals to invade cooperative clusters.
This suggests that in many biological scenarios, the spatial clustering of individ-
uals cannot explain stable cooperation but additional mechanisms are necessary
for spatial structure to promote the evolution of cooperation. For example, it
has recently been shown that delayed adjustment to changes in the environments
can affect the long-term behaviour of microbial communities and promote robust
cooperation [20, 21, 19].
Active motility is an essential part of biological reality. Many different
microbes are motile, showing not only undirected movement, but also highly di-
rected movement along sensed gradients (chemotaxis) [322, 23, 92, 217, 58, 160]
Often, swimming modes include collective phenomena like swarming and the
effective expansion of populations into new habitats. In fact, collective expansion
by random movement [363] and even more so collective expansion by directed
movements along population driven gradients [58] are efficient mechanisms to
ensure fast growth and the successful competition for nutrients [58, 217]. Thus,
if both undirected motility threatens cooperation and motility is part of biological
reality contributing to fitness, this raises the question how fundamental spatial
clustering as a mechanism to explain cooperation really is. Again, the answer
is expected to depend strongly on the specific strains and ecological conditions
one considers. In many situations, where public goods are involved, swimming
might still be negligible. In other situations, however, strong swimming and
public good production might go hand in hand and cooperation is stable because
of the interplay between growth and competition in restructuring populations.
Further experimental studies are needed to investigate these aspects.
10. Conclusions and Outlook
It seems that by asking how cooperation may have emerged and is maintained
in microbial populations we have arrived at more questions than answers. Indeed,
as we have emphasized throughout this review article, there is no unique answer
to this challenging question. In the following, we will give a concise summary
to the answers we found for populations with a given population structure, and
close with a section highlighting some of the future challenges in the field.
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10.1. Conclusions
In this review we considered the dilemma of cooperation in microbial pop-
ulations, and asked what biological and environmental factors can promote the
emergence and maintenance of cooperation in structured populations. Specifi-
cally, we focused on population structures (life cycles) with recurring population
bottlenecks and strong episodes of population growth. As we discussed, all
these aspects are typical features of a broad range of microbial species and eco-
logical settings. The (partial) answer to the dilemma of cooperation obtained
from these studies is that regular dispersal leading to population bottlenecks
and subsequent population growth can promote cooperation. In that sense, the
mechanism is diametrically opposed to Hamilton’s suggestion that limited dis-
persal can facilitate cooperation [133]. A closer look though reveals that in these
structured populations it is actually the interplay between limited dispersal and
strong dispersal resolving the dilemma. During the growth phase after popula-
tion bottlenecks, confinement to a sub-population (limited dispersal) ensures that
public goods shared between cooperating (producing) individuals benefits these
sub-populations such that they have a growth advantage against sub-populations
containing less cooperative individuals. Without dispersal, however, in each of
these sub-populations non-producing individuals would in the long run be better
off and become the dominant species. The only way to avoid such ‘take over’ is
recurrent dispersal into smaller groups.
While the above insights can already be gained by analysing abstract theo-
retical models using a framework that combines evolutionary game theory with
population dynamics [231, 59, 60, 232], a quantitative understanding of a specific
biological system requires an in-depth analysis of the synthesis and regulation
of the public good. We illustrated this for an experimental model population of
Pseudomonas putida. We showed how a combined approach using theory and
experiment provides insights into how the interplay between selection pressure,
growth advantage of more cooperative sub-populations, and demographic noise
affect the dynamics of the entire population. Chemical and biological proper-
ties of the public good — such as its stability and a dose-dependent synthesis
and benefit — were identified as important factors leading to the emergence and
maintenance of public-good-providing traits.
10.2. Future challenges
While theoretical studies have revealed some general principles that facilitate
cooperation, the results discussed in this review also clearly show that there is
a lack of understanding in the cellular and environmental factors that regulate
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public goods. Therefore, future research should avoid preconceived notions
about the interactions between microbes and instead rather focus on an analysis
and understanding of the specific biological and ecological conditions.
Biochemical regulation of public goods. Studying the public good pyoverdine
of Pseudomonas populations in controlled environments, we have seen that bio-
chemical details — such as public good recycling and accumulation — affects
growth and long-term population dynamics. Accumulation, in particular, has
far-reaching consequences on the possibility of sustaining the observed increase
in producer fraction. In fact, even if producers could “cut their losses” and
stop production when some threshold concentration is reached, the benefit from
more abundant pyoverdine would eventually vanish. The public good, in fact,
gradually accumulates also in populations with few producers, allowing them to
eventually reach the same size and pyoverdine concentrations of more producing
ones. Therefore, any population-level advantage from such an accumulating pub-
lic good is bound to vanish in time, and the regulation of pyroverdine production
and its advantage and costs have to be considered within the ecological context
cells live.
Perhaps the most interesting avenue of further research is, then, a rigorous
modeling of the regulatory network, showing in detail the impact of pyoverdine
and iron concentrations on synthesis, but also on cell metabolism. In this review,
in fact, we discussed experimental results obtained with a constitutive producer
strain, but wild-type pseudomonads (for example P. putidaKT2440) strictly regu-
late production. This complex gene network involves central metabolic regulators
and even genes of unknown function [330, 53]. Pyoverdine concentrations, thus,
could affect growth rates beyond iron availability, potentially providing further
benefits to producer strains. In addition, it would be interesting to consider bac-
terial iron acquisition systems without siderophore recycling. For example, in
Escherichia coli the siderophore enterobactin is degraded after being used for
iron uptake [290].
In this review we focused on controlled environments as provided in sim-
ple laboratory experiments. While a good starting point, it is also clear that
we eventually have to understand evolution and the role of public goods within
native environments bearing much higher levels of complexity, including mul-
tiple species, stress factors like pH levels or salt concentrations detrimental to
growth, and a complex mixture of nutrients limiting growth in various ways. As
with exoproducts microbes release, like toxins or exopolysacherides, one has to
critically asses the assumed roles of public goods. Beyond some cooperative
interaction, the public goods discussed in this review might be involved in many
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other interactions and a simple focus on cooperation might be misleading.
Resource abundance and microbial growth. Towards a more complete picture
of public goods and their role in population growth and evolution, many more
investigtions are required. This will particularly require to consider specific eco-
logical scenarios. For example, future investigations could study Pseudomonads
within a certain soil type, or certain gut bacteria within a certain niche of the gut.
Specific quantities to consider include the energy supply which drives microbial
growth in the specific ecological scenario, the time and length scales involved in
nutrient supply and depletion, and the emerging population structure related to
these factors. For example, one may ask what is driving population structure and
growth in soil or within the human gut?
Metabolic exchanges and community dynamics. The exchange ofmetabolites and
their effect on cell growth and survival is another important factor to consider.
Metabolic exchanges depend on the specific ecological scenario one is studying
and can also shift the benefits and costs associated with cooperative behavior.
More detailed investigations in the future should thus also consider specific
metabolic interactions and integrate our current understanding of metabolite
exchanges and microbial community assembly [100, 43, 361].
Quorum sensing and cell-to-cell signaling. The exchange of signaling molecules
is another important factor which can strongly interfere with the emergence and
stability of cooperative behavior. Cellular signaling can tightly couple the expres-
sion of public goods to community sizes (quorum sensing) and environmental
conditions (environmental sensing). Signaling via autoinducers is known to be
involved in the regulation of various pulic goods, including different types of
pyoverdines. Such feedbacks can strongly affect the costs and beneficial aspects
of public goods synthesis [141, 124, 310].
Environmental noise and catastrophes. Further, the fate of microbial populations
is affected by a number of environmental factors, such as the presence of toxins,
temperature, light, pH, or phages [245, 104]. Changes of these factors can be
fast, leading to dramatic shifts of environmental conditions. Often, microbes
themselves are triggering such shifts. Consider for example the lysogenic and
lytic spreading of phages [352, 239, 318], or the fall of local pH values, caused by
acidic fermentation products [57, 11, 288, 289]. Conversely, such sudden envi-
ronmental changes can drastically effect the fitness landscape, strongly selecting
for genes increasing viability and survival. This again changes the costs and
benefits of puplic good synthesis. The dramatic shifts also affect the population
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size and can - similarly as dispersal - lead to population bottlenecks where ef-
fects from demographic noise are particularly pronounced. Recent studies using
conceptual theoretical models have addressed how environmental fluctuations
affect the composition of populations, consisting for example of a fast growing
strain competing with a slow growing (cooperating) species [233, 369, 370].
As with earlier conceptual studies, the future challenge will be to connect these
with specific microbial model systems under controlled - but hopefully realistic
environmental conditions.
Multi-species communities. Microbial communities often consist of many dif-
ferent species, adding another layer of complexity. In this review we focused
on closely related strains, varying only in their capability to produce public
goods. Genetic and phenotypic differences in real microbial communities can
however be very strong. For example, sequencing studies have shown that spe-
cific environments are often occupied by strains from different bacterial phyla
and geni [151, 339]. A dramatic example is the gut microbiota of vertebrates,
which consists of up to hundreds of different bacterial species, varying vastly
over space and time [55, 219]. While a strong functional redundancy of genes
across different species is typically observed [220], each species can show distinct
growth and survival phenotypes. The species richness and functional redundancy
can have strong impacts on community function and thus also on the evolution-
ary stability of cooperative behavior. For example, cross-feeding within these
complex communities involves the exchange of many different metabolites [256],
affecting the cellular resources allocated to different cellular processes and thus
also the benefits, costs and selection pressures of cooperative traits.
Spatially extended systems and biofilms. Going beyondwell-mixed systems leads
to further challenges in understanding the population dynamics of microbial
communities. For example, physical factors might further promote coopera-
tion. Recent theoretical suggestions include differential adhesion between mi-
crobes [107], the formation of cooperator aggregates promoting preferred access
to public goods [271], different types of fluid flow [74, 122], and biofilm for-
mation [251, 87]. Increased phage resistance by biofilm formation is another
important direction to go [356]. More attention should also be given to the role
of phenotypic heterogeneity and plasticity which, as discussed above, is an im-
portant feature of pyoverdine-producers such as P. putida.
Addressing the challenges described here requires comprehensive interdisci-
plinary research approaches which combine the different ecological and bio-
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logical scales involved. This includes particularly the environmental conditions
supporting the growth of microbial communities, evolution and the ecological
interactions within these communities, and the physiological characterization of
the single species involved. We believe that modeling will be an essential part of
this research path as it allows to investigate the interplay of these different levels
at play.
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A. Relation between Price and replicator equation
As mentioned in the main text, the Price equation can be mapped to the
replicator equation. This mapping is shown here. We start from the adjusted
replicator equation
Ûxk = fk − f¯
f¯
xk (1 − xk) , (A.1)
where fk is the fitness of a certain trait k, x is the relative abundance of just
this trait and f¯ =
∑
k xk fk is the average fitness in the population. In contrast to
the replicator equation, where the fractions of certain traits, xk are considered,
the Price equation analyzes the values of the traits, zi. To achieve a mapping,
the more general quantity, zi, has to be chosen appropriately: The trait zi now
marks the belonging of an individual, i, to a certain species, k. Each species,
k, can be distinguished by its typical value of the trait zk . We therefore define
new traits whose values are z˜(k)i = 1 if the individual i is of type k and z˜
(k)
i = 0
if it belongs to any other species. This can be summarized to z˜(k)i = δzi,zk . The
fraction of species k is then given by xk = 〈z˜(k)i 〉 =
∑
i hiδzi,zk . The growth factor,
wi, in the Price equation corresponds to the fitness of an individual and therefore
solely depends on the species the considered individual belongs to. Therefore, it
is given by wi =
∑
l δzi,zl fl . For example an individual, i, belonging to species k
has the growth factor wi = fk . The average growth factors is then given by the
average fitness in the population, 〈wi〉 = f¯ . As mutations are not included, z˜(k)i
does not change and ∆z˜(k)i = 0 holds. Taken together, this yields the following
modification of the Price equation (3),
∆xk f¯ =
∑
i
hi z˜
(k)
i wi − f¯ xk . (A.2)
The term
∑
i hi z˜
(k)
i wi =
∑
i,l hiδzi,zkδzi,zl fl is nonzero only if the considered species
is of type k. Then its fitness is always given by fk . Therefore, one finds that∑
i hi z˜
(k)
i wi = fk
∑
i hiδzi,zk = fk xk holds and Eq. (A.2) simplifies to,
∆xk f¯ = ( fk − f¯ ) xk . (A.3)
This expression is equivalent to the adjusted replicator equation for discrete time
steps. Performing the limit ∆t → 0 then gives Eq. (A.1).
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B. Selection on two levels and Hamilton’s rule
To mathematically analyse the situation, we consider the Price equation as
introduced in Section 5.1. Aswe specifically consider two levels of selection here,
we also formulate the Price equation with two levels. All quantities previously
introduced in Sec. 5.1 now come in two forms, for the intra- and inter-group
level 17. Let us start with the intra-group level: Each individual therein is
classified by its trait zi,α ∈ {0, 1} where 0 corresponds to a free-rider and 1 to a
cooperator. The index i specifies the individual and α its group. The factor hi,α
corresponds to a trait’s abundance. Summing them up leads to the average trait
of a group Zα = 〈zi,α〉α = ∑i zi,αhi,α. The reproduction success of an individual
in the considered time interval ∆t is given by the fitness factor wi,α.
Thus, the Price equation, describing the change of the average trait in each
group is given by:
∆〈zi,α〉α〈wi,α〉α = Cov[ziwi]α. (B.1)
In this equation, the term 〈∆zi,αwi,α〉α is not present as mutations towards
different phenotypes are not considered and ∆zi,α = 0 holds. For the coopera-
tion scenario, cooperators have a fitness disadvantage within groups. Thus, the
covariance between individual trait value and its fitness is negative. As a conse-
quence, the average trait value within each group, independently of its internal
composition. An example of this is shown in Fig. 3(c).
Next, let us consider the upper level, comparing different groups. Each group
has the trait Zα, depending on the individuals within this group, Zα = 〈zi,α〉α.
At the same time, competition between the groups (inter-group selection) is
described by the Price equation:
〈∆Zα〉〈Wα〉 = Cov[ZαWα] + 〈∆ZαWα〉. (B.2)
Here, the fitness factor Wα describes the relative success of different group.
In Table. B.1 the corresponding terms on both levels are summarized. Note,
that there are two kinds of averages, the one within a group summing over all
individuals, 〈xi,α〉α, and the inter group average summing over all groups, 〈Xα〉.
Mathematically, an increase in the global level of cooperators corresponds
to 〈∆Zα〉 > 0. Employing the price equations on both levels, this inequality
can be somewhat simplified as we mathematically discuss in Appendix B. The
inequality obtains a form:
BR > C. (B.3)
17This analysis follow [230, 56]
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Level Ind. Abu. Average Small Entity Large Entity Gr. F.
Inter α Hα 〈Xα〉 = ∑α XαHα Group Zα Set of groups 〈Zα〉 Wα
Intra i hi,α 〈xi,α〉α = ∑i xi,αhi,α Individual zi,α Group 〈zi,α〉α = Zα wi,α
Table B.1: Comparison of the different quantities and averages to describe the simultaneous
selection on the inter- and intra-group level. From left to right, the summation index, the
abundance, the average, the smaller and the larger entity and the growth factors are shown
If this inequality is true, than the inter-group level dominates, and the global level
of cooperation increases. Otherwise, the global level of cooperation decreases.
To simplify the condition for an increase of global population levels consider
the inequality 〈∆Zα〉 > 0. Importantly, average level of cooperation within each
group depends on the individual cells. Let us thus start with the price equation
describing traits within groups, Equation B.4. By multiplying this expression
with Hα and summing over all groups, α, it transforms to,∑
α
Hα∆z¯αw¯α =
∑
α
HαCov[ziwi]α
〈∆ZαWα〉 = 〈Cov[ziwi]α〉. (B.4)
Combining Eqs. (B.2) and (B.4) leads to the following condition for the
regime of stable cooperation,
Cov[Zα,Wα] + 〈Cov[ziwi]α〉 > 0. (B.5)
Now, the identity Cov[AαBα]α = K(Aα, Bα)Var[Aα] (and accordingly on the
intra-group level Cov[ai,αbi,α]α = kα(ai,α, bi,α)Var[ai,α]α) following from linear
regression can be used to further simplify the inequality,
K(Zα,Wα)Var[Zα] + 〈kα(zi,α,wi,α)Var[zi,α]α〉 > 0. (B.6)
The factor kα(zi,α,wi,α) corresponds to the disadvantage of cooperators within
each group. If this disadvantage does not depend on the group α, which is for ex-
ample the case for public good producing bacteria whose metabolic disadvantage
is independent of the group composition, Eq. (B.6) can be further simplified:
Var[Zα]
〈Var[zi,α]α〉 K(Zα,Wα) > −kα(zi,α,wi,α). (B.7)
This expression is a general form of Hamilton’s rule, R · B > C with the
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relatedness, benefit and cost functions given as
R = Var[Zα]/〈Var[zi,α]α〉 (B.8)
B = K(Zα,Wα) , (B.9)
C = −kα(zi,α,wi,α) . (B.10)
The significance of this rule is briefly discussed in Section 6.4. Here we
further note that the notion of a group structure can mathematically be used in
a very general sense and does not rely on the strict spatial separation of groups.
Further, many studies have also investigated very different structures, including
network-structures or interacting with neighbouring individuals on a lattice; see
also the discussion in Section 9 were we discuss spatially extended systems were
local sub-populations are not well mixed.
For completeness, we note that the Price equation has been extended to
describe evolution across several levels [134, 270]. The framework is hence
often called the framework of multi-level selection and such approaches have
been discussed in the context of major transitions [169, 270].
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